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Abstract
Three experiments examine how expressions of probability concerning why a risk
involved in a medical procedure was not disclosed influence mock juror decisions (e.g.,
liability, culpability, and damage awards). Across all three experiments, no differences
were found in mock juror judgments of liability due to the probability expression used,
be it verbal, quantitative, percentage, or frequency. Furthermore, differences in mean
damage awards were only found when psychological uncertainty was manipulated using
a frequency expression. However, an examination of the median damage awards
suggests that some expressions of probability are likely to result in higher damage
awards than others. Thus, while the type of probability expression used does not appear
to influence whether or not a physician-defendant is found liable, it may have an impact
on the size of the damage award. A fourth experiment examines how expressions of
probability concerning a non-disclosed risk influence decisions of whether or not a
patient should undergo treatment. The results of this experiment indicate that hindsight
(i.e., knowledge of the complication occurring during surgery) may have played a role in
the results of Experiments 1-3. Implications and recommendations for physicians and
lawyers are discussed.

vi
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Introduction/Informed Consent
What constitutes a truly informed patient? The legal answer is one who has
received all relevant information necessary for him/her to make a reasonable decision
(Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Jasper, 1996; Lidz et al., 1983; F. Rozovsky, 1990). In
medical situations, this would include an explanation o f what the treatment would
involve, the benefits and risks associated with the treatment, and available alternatives
(including non-treatment). While this appears to answer the question, the devil is in the
details, or in this case, the lack of details. For example how are “relevant” and “all”
determined? Are the same things relevant to all patients, or does disclosure need to be
tailored to each individual? Is a risk relevant based on the frequency of occurrence, the
severity of the risk involved, some combination of the two, or something else entirely?
Is merely mentioning a risk enough or does it require further explanation, and if so, how
much and in what manner? With few exceptions the law does not define the amount and
type of information necessary for informed consent (e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.40 E).
This ambiguity in the informed consent laws has been a source of frustration for
physicians, and has led to perceptions that the laws are just legal ploys allowing
disgruntled patients to recover damages in situations involving a bad outcome that is not
the result of negligence (Curran, 1970; DeLee, 1976; Slovenko, 1997). Physicians have
also viewed informing the patient as an impediment to successfully performing their job
not only because informing the patient is time consuming for both the patient and the
physician, but because it is cruel, punitive, and inexcusable to mention all the possible
negative outcomes to a patient already suffering from the fear of undergoing procedures
1
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such as surgery (DeLee, 1976). Some also feel that consent forms would necessarily
frighten many patients away from treatments that would be beneficial to them (DeLee,
1976). While the resistance to informed consent is no longer as strong as it once was,1
physicians are still concerned about the lack of explicit guidelines constituting what
“informed” means (Daniels & Andrews, 1989).
The current experiments are designed to explore what factors influence jurors’
determination of liability in informed consent cases. This will not only provide
physicians with some suggestions for protecting themselves against lawsuits, but may
also improve physician-patient communication resulting in improved care. Before
describing the current experiments, I will provide a brief overview of informed consent
law.
While many people consider informed consent to be just a form they sign in order
to receive treatment, health care providers who treat it as such may face malpractice
claims. A number of commentators from different professions have written about the
proliferation of malpractice claims based on a lack of informed consent (Curran, 1970;
Eisner, 1985; Hirsh and Wilcox, 1992; Slovenko, 1997). William Curran (1970) of
Harvard Medical School claims that failure to obtain informed consent is one of the two

bindings that patient satisfaction and good physician-patient communication,
both of which presumably result from better informed consent, lead to fewer malpractice
claims have softened the blow of the extra work required to obtain an informed consent
(Dobson, 1989; Levinson 1994; Levinson, Roter, Mullooly, Dull, & Frankel, 1997; Mark
& Spiro, 1990; L. Rozovsky, 1990).
2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

favorite plaintiff doctrines of courtroom attack (the other being res ipsa loquitur)}
Hirsh and Wilcox (1992), both lawyers, claim that over the past 20 years the failure to
disclose medical risks has become a major and steadily increasing source of recovering
damages in malpractice cases. They claim that when malpractice lawyers are unable to
prove negligent medical treatment, their fallback position is that the health care provider
neglected to obtain the patient’s informed consent and that the plaintiffs injuries resulted
from risks that the patient would not have been willing to accept had the information
been disclosed to him. Likewise, Slovenko (1997) described informed consent as a ploy
developed “to provide another course of action in cases of poor outcome when
negligence in treatment could not be established” (p. 652).
The data concerning the frequency of malpractice claims neither clearly support
nor contradict physicians’ concern that the changes in informed consent laws would
increase either the number of malpractice claims made, or the number of lawsuits
resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners found that the issue of informed consent was raised as an issue in only
3% of the malpractice cases resolved between 1975 and 1976 (Law & Polan, 1978).
Likewise, the Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973), created by the Secretary of
the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, determined that informed
consent was the most significant issue in only 2.4% of all appellate malpractice decisions
nationwide through 1971. Robertson (1991) determined that there had been little impact
translated, this means the situation speaks for itself. This refers to a common
sense inference that something occurred that would only occur if someone else was
careless (e.g., physician amputates the wrong foot).
3
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on the frequency or severity of malpractice claims in the ten years after the Supreme
Court of Canada introduced major changes in the law of informed consent.
On the other hand, Annas (1976) indicates that while very few claims are filed
solely on the grounds of a lack of informed consent (and fewer still have resulted in a
verdict for the plaintiff) an increasing number of lawsuits filed against physicians include
the allegation of a lack of informed consent. Danzon (1986) showed that, in 1976,
jurisdictions that had adopted informed consent laws by 1970 had claims costs nearly
double that of states which had not yet adopted informed consent laws. Similarly, a
report, published by the American Hospital Association (Ludlam, 1978), stated that in
the mid-1970s an allegation of failure to obtain informed consent was made in 14% of all
malpractice cases filed.
While the evidence is somewhat conflicting concerning the frequency of claims of
a lack of informed consent, the arguments espoused above (e.g., Curran, 1970; Hirsh &
Wilcox, 1992; Slovenko, 1997) are indicative of the perception of a medical malpractice
crisis (e.g., increased filings and outrageous damage awards) brought about in part by an
overly permissive legal system (Daniels & Andrews, 1989; Eisner, 1985). This is
important in that if health care providers are overly concerned about facing a malpractice
claim, it could affect the quality of their care. That is, their focus may be on what they
can do to protect themselves instead of on what is in the best interest of the patient. For
example, physicians may refuse to treat non-emergent cases that are either difficult or are
just as likely to get worse as they are to get better for fear that they will be sued if the
patient does not recover. Furthermore, they may fail to mention new, innovative
4
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treatments for fear of the patient choosing that treatment, then suing after a bad outcome
because the risks of new treatment were not folly explained. Even if the data do not
support these beliefs, they still have the potential to influence health care provider
behavior.
Legal Requirements of Informed Consent
In 1957, the case of Salgo v. Lelanri Stanford Jr.. University Board of Trustees
changed the physician-patient relationship from one of physician beneficence to one of
patient autonomy. In this case, the patient had consented to an aortography which
resulted in paralysis from the waist down. However, the patient had not known that
paralysis was a risk involved in this procedure. Drawing on previous cases that had
established a right against unauthorized touching in relation to medical procedures (i.e.,
Mohrv Williams 1905: Schloendorff v. The Society of New York Hospitals. 1914), the
court held that it was not enough for a surgeon to obtain consent to a procedure, but
that it had to be an informed consent. To obtain informed consent, the physician must
disclose all facts relevant to a patient’s rights and interests, as well as the risks, hazards,
and dangers involved (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Jasper, 1996; Lidz et al., 1983; F.
Rozovsky, 1990), enabling the patient to make the final decision of whether or not to
undergo the procedure. This decision must be made voluntarily with no coercion,
duress, or undue influence by the health care provider3 (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986;

3An attempt has been made in this paper to use “health care provider,” instead of
physician or doctor, as an indication that these laws apply to a wide range of care givers
in addition to physicians (e.g., nurses, therapists, etc.). However, the term physician is
occasionally used for ease of reading or if a study specifically refers to only physicians.
5
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Jasper, 1996; lid z et aL, 1983; F. Rozovsky, 1990). This case clearly changed the role
of the patient from one of passive recipient to active consumer of medical care.
Informed consent is necessary for all types of treatment and investigative
procedures, whether they are routine or highly invasive (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; F.
Rozovsky, 1990). It is not merely the signing of a form giving permission to proceed,
but a process in which both the patient and health care provider exchange information
allowing the patient to reach an informed decision concerning whether or not to undergo
the proposed treatment (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990). Indeed,
signed forms are not even legally necessary, although they are helpful for documentation
purposes. For this process to be effective, both the patient and the health care provider
must be active participants. Obviously, the patient requires active input from the health
care provider in order to obtain the details necessary to reach a decision regarding the
treatment (i.e., risks, benefits, and alternatives). The patient must also actively provide
information (i.e., accurate medical history) so the health care provider is aware of any
complicating conditions (e.g., drug sensitivities) that may affect the treatment choice.
The patient is also responsible for informing the health care provider about any
particularly strong feelings toward potential side effects or outcomes (e.g., if a woman
wants to have children a hysterectomy as a preventative measure may not be acceptable)
so he can tailor the disclosure to the particular patient.
Criteria for a Valid Consent
To determine whether the consent given is legally valid, a number of basic criteria
must be met (Flowers, 1987; Forrest, Perez, & Kawamura, 1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
6
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First, the consent must have been given voluntarily. Health care providers are permitted
to urge patients to follow a given recommendation; however, they are not allowed to
coerce or obtain the consent from a patient under duress. Second, the patient must be
both legally and mentally competent to give authorization (Dymek, Marson, & Harrell,
1999). A person is presumed to be mentally competent to give consent unless a judicial
order or an applicable piece of legislation states otherwise. Third, the patient must
possess sufficient information in order to reach a decision (Chalmers & Swartz, 1993;
Flowers, 1987; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
Although the amount of information required can vary among jurisdictions (see
section on Louisiana below), all jurisdictions require that the patient be provided with at
least: (1) the likely outcome of diagnostic tests; (2) the likely benefits of diagnostic tests
in determining a patient’s illness or the extent of his or her injury, (3) the probable
outcome of medical and/or surgical interventions; (4) the likely benefits from medical
and/or surgical procedures; (5) an explanation of what a diagnostic, medical or surgical
procedure will involve, including any probable complications, and any temporary
discomfort, disability, or disfigurement; (6) an explanation of any permanent results of a
medical or surgical procedure; (7) a disclosure of risks that are reasonably foreseeable at
the time that consent is obtained; (8) the disclosure of remote risks that are probable for
particular patients (e.g., patients with long-standing histories of severe allergic reactions
to foods and medicines should be informed of the risk of an allergic reaction to contrast
dye used in diagnostic tests; those without such histories need not be informed); and (9)

7
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the availability of reasonable alternative procedures (Chalmers & Swartz, 1993; Flowers,
1987; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
The fourth criterion requires the disclosure of information to be at a level that is
understandable to the patient (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Flowers, 1987; Forrest et al.,
1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990). Presenting the information at too high a level may cause
patients to become too embarrassed or intimidated to admit not understanding
something. Alternatively, presenting the information at too low a level may insult
patients to the point that they do not ask pertinent questions. Either way can lead to the
patient’s M ure to obtain and/or understand enough information to make an informed
decision.
The final criterion of informed consent concerns how the health care provider
responds to a patient’s questions. First, the patient must have the opportunity to ask
questions. Second, any question that is asked should be answered in as straightforward a
manner as possible, taking the needs and health of the patient into account. This allows
health care providers to withhold certain information if, in their medical judgment, its
disclosure might endanger a patient’s health. However, this is permitted only in limited
situations and if challenged, the health care provider must prove the decision was
reasonable in the circumstances. The withholding of information is not permitted just
because the disclosure may result in the patient refusing treatment, nor can the notion
that “Doctor knows best” be the basis of the decision (F. Rozovsky, 1990).
Who Must Ohtain the Informed Consent? The duty to disclose the relevant
information to the patient M s on the health care provider who will perform the
8
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diagnostic test, medical treatment, or surgery. This is based on the premise that the
health care provider performing the procedure has the most information and is best able
to handle any questions posed by the patient. Liability for M ure to obtain an informed
consent is limited to the actual health care provider performing the procedure. That is,
hospitals cannot be held responsible for a lack of informed consent for a procedure
performed on their premises, unless it can be shown that the hospital knew, or should
have known, that a health care provider had not obtained a patient’s consent (Faden &
Beauchamp, 1986; F. Rozovsky, 1990).
Legal Standards. There are two basic legal standards against which to judge
liability: (I) the medical community (or standard practice) standard; and (2) the patient
need (or reasonable person) standard. Initially, all informed consent cases fell under the
medical community standard (Dailey, 1994; Dobson, 1989; McMahon, 1986; Minter,
1984; Olcott, 1989), which is the same standard used in medical negligence cases.
Today, more and more jurisdictions are changing to the patient need standard (Dailey,
1994; Olcott, 1989).
Under the medical community standard, the health care provider is only required
to disclose information that would be disclosed by other health care providers in the
same community (Dailey, 1994; Dobson, 1989; Olcott, 1989; F. Rozovsky, 1990). In
trying cases under this standard, expert testimony (i.e., of other health care providers) is
required to establish what the common practice is. There are some problems with using
this standard. First, what needs to be disclosed is defined by the very people whom the
lawsuits would be brought against. Thus, the medical community may decide that
9
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disclosure of any number o f risks is not necessary, thereby making it impossible for
health care providers to be found liable for malpractice even if disclosure would have
caused the patient to refuse treatment.
Another problem is that the medical community standard is not defined exactly
the same in all jurisdictions. One definition is agreement by “a considerable number”
(Dailey, 1994, p. 713) of health care providers regarding the correct course of treatment.
Thus, health care providers may hesitate to use innovative medical treatments that have
not yet obtained this level of acceptance for fear of the patient choosing said alternative
and then having the basis for a liability claim (Dailey, 1994). This situation not only
deprives patients of control over their treatment, as intended by informed consent
statutes, but it actually provides a disincentive for health care providers to try innovative
or new treatments, thereby slowing the advance of medical care.
Under the patient need standard, first established in Canterbury v. Spence (1972),
the requirement for informed consent is what a reasonable person in the patient’s
position would have done. Here, the amount of information that is required to make an
informed decision is based on what the patient needs to know, not on what the health
care provider deems appropriate. In cases using this standard, plaintiffs are allowed to
state that if they had been informed, prior to undergoing treatment, o f the risk o f the
negative outcome that occurred, they would not have agreed to it. Hindsight can
definitely play a role here, in that the negative outcome has already occurred and it is
difficult to determine what patients actually would have chosen to do had they been fully
informed. No expert testimony is required under this standard.
10
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Critics of the reasonable person standard claim that it is not in the best interest of
either the patient or the health care provider and is impossible to satisfy. For example,
one claim is that only physicians have the ability to estimate effectively the psychological
and physical ramifications that disclosure might produce in a patient. Another claim is
that the reasonable person standard is too burdensome, causing physicians to waste time
in reviewing every possible risk with the patient, thereby interfering with the physician’s
discretion to determine what form of treatment is appropriate for the patient (Olcott,
1989). Finally, once the plaintiff states that he/she should have been informed about
something, the burden is shifted to the health care provider to prove why that
information was not disclosed. However, under the medical community standard, the
response to why a patient was not informed may simply be “no one else does either,”
which is equally undesirable.
Informed Consent in Louisiana
Louisiana has one of the most detailed informed consent laws. In 1975,
Louisiana attempted to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the informed consent laws by
passing the Louisiana Uniform Consent Law (La. R.S. 40:1299.40). This law states that,
unless it is proven that the consent was obtained by a misrepresentation of material facts,
it will be presumed to be valid as long as the following conditions were met:
1.

The physician told the patient the nature and purpose of the
procedure together with the risks, if any, of death, brain damage,
quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss of function of an organ or limb,
and of disfiguring scars associated with such procedures.

11
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2.

The physician acknowledges that such disclosure of information
has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure
have been answered in a satisfactory manner.

3.

The consent is signed by the patient.

Not only did this law make it very difficult to establish the claim o f a lack of
informed consent, the risks included in the first condition were considered to be all the
relevant risks that had to be disclosed regardless of the procedure. This law was upheld
until 1989 when the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in Hondroulis v. Schnmaker (1989)
that “loss of function of an organ” was too vague, and that health care providers needed
to disclose material risks (i.e., those that a reasonable person would need to know in
order to decide whether or not to undergo the proposed treatment).4 As a result,
physicians began to list as many risks as possible (in some cases over 100) because they
were not sure what a court would determine to be material in hindsight (Palmisano,
1995).
Then, in 1990 Louisiana created the Medical Disclosure Panel (R.S. 40:1299.40
E). This panel was created “within the Department of Health and Hospitals to determine
which risks and hazards related to medical care and surgical procedures must be
disclosed by a physician or other health care provider to a patient or persons authorized
to consent for a patient and to establish the general form and substance of such
disclosure” (pg. 2, La R.S. 40:1299.40 E). The panel consists of six physicians, three
attorneys from the Louisiana Trial Lawyers’ Association, one attorney from the

4Note that this helped to solidify Louisiana’s adoption of the reasonable person
standard.
12
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Louisiana Defense Counsel Association, and one dentist who specializes in oral and
maxillofacial surgery. This amendment to R.S. 40:1299.40 listed the following five
requirements that must be met by the health care provider in order to be covered by the
provisions of the statute:
1.

Disclosure of the risks and hazards in the form and to the degree
required by the panel.

2.

Disclosure of additional risks, if any, particular to a patient
because of a complicating medical condition, either told to the
physician or other health care provider by the patient or his
representative in a medical history of the patient or reasonably
discoverable by such physician or other health care provider.

3.

Disclosure of reasonable therapeutic alternative and risks
associated with such alternatives.

4.

Relate that he is obtaining a consent to medical treatment
pursuant to the lists formulated by the Louisiana Medical
Disclosure Panel.

5.

Provide an opportunity to ask any questions about the
contemplated medical or surgical procedure, risks, or alternatives
and acknowledge in writing that he answered such questions, to
the patient or other person authorized to give consent to medical
treatment, receipt of which shall be acknowledged in writing.

As of April, 2000, the Louisiana Medical Disclosure Panel has determined the risks
required to be disclosed for 176 different procedures, and continues to meet to update
their findings.
Phvsician-Patient Communication

Informed consent laws have determined that patients should be provided a great
deal of information about their illness and treatment. But do patients want all of this
information? A number of studies indicate that the vast majority of people (with the
13
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possible exception of elderly patients) desire to be informed about their care, even if it
includes negative information (Benbassat, Pilpel, & Tidhar, 1998; Deber, 1994;
Guadagnoli & Ward, 1998; Mazur & Hickam, 1997a, 1997b; Strull, Lo, & Charles,
1984; Thompson, Pitts, & Schwankovsky, 1993). Lidz et al. (1983) identified four
reasons why patients wish to be informed: (1) to facilitate compliance; (2) to be shown
respect; (3) to overrule physicians’ decisions (rarely); and (4) to play an active role in
decision making (only 10% of the patients).
Studies comparing patients (Degner & Sloan, 1992; Strull et al., 1984) and non
patients (Deber, Kraetschmer, & Irvie, 1996; Degner & Sloan, 1992; Strull et al., 1984)
have found that non-patients report a higher desire for information (Benbassat et al.,
1998; Degner, 1998; Degner & Sloan, 1992). This occurs even when hypothetical
situations are presented to both populations (Ende, Kazis, Ash, & Moskowitz, 1989).
Benbassat et al. (1998) suggest that non-patient preferences may reflect ideal or
normative expectations, while those elicited from patients (typically with chronic illness)
reflect more realistic expectations. Thus, one potential problem with jurors determining
liability is that their desire for information may be different from the patients who must
actually make the treatment choice.
Since it is clear that patients desire to be informed, one must next consider the
patient’s ability to understand the information they are given. No matter how much
information is disclosed, if the patient does not understand it, then informed consent has
not been achieved (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). Common sense suggests that the
information needs to be presented in concise, non-technical ways, although it is not clear
14
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as to what is the “best” way to present the information (Entwistle, Sheldon, Sowden, &
Watt, 1998; Levinson, 1997).
One area that may be particularly problematic is the communication of the risks
involved with a given procedure. This information is often described in probabilistic
terms and a great amount of research has shown that people are generally poor
processors of probabilistic information (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman
& Tversky, 1972; Saks & Kidd, 1980; Weinstein, 1999), especially when the
probabilities involved are less than 1%, which is often the case in medical risk
communication (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Halpem, Blackman, & Salzman, 1989;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Stone, Yates, & Parker, 1994).
How the probabilistic information is expressed can also be problematic because
physicians (and other professionals) prefer to use verbal expressions of probability (e.g.,
“rare” or “common”) when discussing uncertainty (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Eddy, 1990;
Merz, Druzdzel, & Mazur, 1991; Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth,
1986). Not only have the interpretations of these expressions been shown to be highly
variable (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Cohen, Deamley, & Hansel,
1958; Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967), but the manner in which people use them has also
been shown to be inconsistent (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; but see
Kong, Barnett, Mosteller, & Youtz, 1986 for an exception).
This lack of clear consistency has caused some commentators to suggest that
expressions of uncertainty should always be made with a quantitative estimate (Nakao &
Axelrod, 1983; Shaw & Dear, 1990). This is bolstered by the evidence that even though
15

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

people prefer to give estimates of probability using verbal phrases, they prefer to receive
estimates of probability in numeric form (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Moxey & Sanford, 2000;
Olsen & Budescu, 1997; Shaw & Dear, 1990). However, it is not clear that patients
would necessarily understand and use quantitative estimates appropriately since, as
mentioned above, people are not good processors of probabilistic information
(Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Furthermore, there are multiple
ways in which to present quantitative information (i.e., percentages, frequencies, and
probabilities), and these may be interpreted differently.
Juror Reactions to Probability Evidence
With improved technology (e.g., computer modeling and data analysis programs)
and scientific advances (e.g., DNA typing), the amount and type of statistical and
probability evidence that is available for use has greatly increased (Faigman & Baglioni,
1988; Schklar & Diamond, 1999). The courts, however, have typically greeted
statistical and probabilistic evidence with skepticism and suspicion (Ellsworth & Mauro,
1998; Koehler, 1992). Some legal commentators have claimed that because people
(including judges) have a difficult time understanding probabilities, the potential for
abuse is high (Tribe, 1971). One argument is that probabilistic evidence gives the
appearance of precision, and as such, jurors will place too much weight on this evidence
(Tribe, 1971). Another criticism of probabilistic evidence is that because it only
describes what happens in general, it is useless forjudging what happened in a particular
case (Ellsworth & Mauro, 1998; Tribe, 1971). Indeed some jurisdictions have used
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these reasons to deny the inclusion o f associative evidence5 (although the majority of
jurisdictions allow it), such as blood and fiber matching (Jonakait, 1983; Thompson &
Schumann, 1987).
The empirical evidence, though, indicates that people actually underweight
probability information in both legal (Faigman & Baglioni, 1988; Goodman, 1992;
Schklar & Diamond, 1999; Smith, Penrod, Otto, & Park, 1996; Thompson & Schumann,
1987) and non-legal (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Saks & Kidd,
1980) contexts. Saks and Kidd (1980) even suggest that rather than being overwhelmed
by statistical information, triers o f fact are likely to ignore it.
While the above studies suggest that mock jurors would not overemphasize
probabilistic information, they indicate that people neither intuitively understand the rules
of statistical inference (Lichtenstein, Slovic, FischhofF, Layman, & Coombs, 1978; Nisbet
& Ross, 1980) nor properly integrate probabilistic information (Bar-Hillel, 1980;
FischhofF& Beth-Marom, 1983; Kahneman etal., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
One suggested approach to improve probabilistic reasoning in the courts is to present
expert testimony on how to interpret probabilistic information properly (Faigman &
Baglioni, 1988; Finkelstein & Farley, 1970). This testimony would focus on the use of
Bayes’ theorem to combine statistical and probabilistic evidence that might otherwise be
difficult to understand (Finkelstein & Farley, 1970). Unfortunately this approach has not
met with much success (Faigman & Baglioni, 1988; Goodman, 1992; Schklar &

’Associative evidence refers to matches that can be established between evidence
found at the scene and the defendant. This includes DNA, hair, soil, glass, paint, and
bodily fluid matching.
17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Diamond, 1999; Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000; Smith, Penrod, Otto, & Park,
1996).
Recently, though, a number of studies have found that Bayesian reasoning can be
improved by presenting probability information as frequencies instead of as percentages
(Gigerenzer& Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Slovic et al., 2000). This
is consistent with a growing amount of research indicating that some cognitive biases
(e.g., base rate neglect, overconfidence, and the conjunction fallacy) can be eliminated by
using frequency information as opposed to percentages (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;
Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991). This issue will be more
fully explored in Experiment 2.
Current Experiments
When jurors are presented with a lack of informed consent case, the plaintiff is
claiming that either the risk was not disclosed at all, or the amount of information
provided about the risk was insufficient to make a reasonable choice (i.e., the patient
would have chosen differently had more information been provided). For any treatment,
there is a vast amount of information that could be conveyed to the patient. While
informed consent laws have increased the amount of information that patients receive,
there are still no guidelines indicating how much is enough.
One might suggest that health care providers just give patients all the available
information. However, presenting too much information may result in cognitive
overload, thereby impairing comprehension (Doak, Doak, Friedell, & Meade, 1998;
Jolly, Scott, & Sanford, 1995). Providing too much information may also be detrimental
18
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in a lawsuit. Goebert (1979) suggests that the longer the informed consent form is, the
less likely the patient will have read the fine print and the sooner a jury will realize that
the patient signed a document which he/she did not understand.
Health care providers are also limited in the amount of time they are able to
spend with each patient. Studies have shown that physicians spend an average of about
15-20 minutes with patients in both routine visits (Levinson et al., 1997) and visits to
discuss specific procedures (Mark & Spiro, 1990). As such, health care providers face
the difficult challenge of determining which information should be disclosed in the limited
amount of time they have. Then, they must make sure that the patient can understand
the information. Thus, it would be beneficial to determine what information patients
need to know, as well as the best way to present that information. Since Louisiana has
created the Medical Disclosure panel to address the former, the current studies will focus
on the latter.
As stated earlier, people generally do not process probabilistic information very
well (Kahneman et al., 1982). Three experiments have been designed to explore the
factors surrounding the communication of the risks associated with undergoing surgery
to remove a tumor. Even though health care providers typically prefer to provide
probability estimates using verbal expressions (Beth-Marom, 1982; Eddy, 1990; Merz et
al., 1991; Wallsten et al., 1986), the high variability found in the interpretations of these
expressions have led to the suggestion that risk communication for medical procedures
always include a quantitative estimate (Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Shaw & Dear, 1990).
However, no study has examined how jurors respond to probability information
19
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presented either verbally or quantitatively in a medical malpractice case. The first
experiment addresses this issue, using a summary of a medical malpractice case based on
a lack of informed consent.
While little research has directly compared verbal and quantitative estimates,
there has been a great deal of interest in comparing different formats (i.e., frequencies
versus percentages) of quantitative estimates (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995; Thompson & Schumann, 1987; Slovic et al., 2000). The typical finding
is that participants respond differently to each probability format, with better
comprehension and reasoning being associated with the frequency format. However, this
research has focused mainly on associative evidence in criminal trials, such as blood or
DNA matching. Experiment 2 extends this comparison to a civil trial using the same
case summary as Experiment 1.
In addition to comparing probability formats, there has also been a great deal of
interest in assessing “psychological uncertainty” (Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein,
1992; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). Psychological
uncertainty refers to the different representations of mathematically equivalent
information presented as frequencies. For example, the proportion of 10% could be
represented as either 1 out of 10 or as 10 out of 100. These studies typically find that
participants prefer the option for which they can imagine the desired outcome occurring
the most often (e.g., 10/100 for a chance at drawing a winning lottery ticket; Epstein,
1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et al., 1989). However, these studies rely
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almost exclusively on lottery tasks. Experiment 3 examines whether adjusting the
psychological uncertainty of an event will affect judgments in a civil trial.
In all three experiments, the issue at trial is whether mock jurors view the risk of
the injury sustained during medical treatment as reasonably foreseeable prior to
undergoing the surgery. The focus will be on how the probability of the risk occurring is
explained (as the reason why the information was not disclosed). In doing so, these
experiments will not only extend the research on risk communication and probabilistic
reasoning mentioned above to civil trials, but they will also provide health care providers
with valuable information about ways to improve communication with their patients and
avoid malpractice claims.

21
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Experiment 1: Verbal vs. Quantitative Expressions of Probability
People prefer to give estimates o f probability using verbal expressions but prefer
to receive estimates in numeric form (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Olson & Budescu, 1997;
Shaw & Dear, 1990). This sets up a non-optimal situation for the transmission of risk
information from health care provider to patient. Since informed consent laws focus on
the understanding of the patient, the inherent vagueness associated with verbal
expressions has led many to suggest that health care providers go against their
preference and provide quantitative expressions of risk (Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Shaw
& Dear, 1990). This suggestion, though, is typically made following mapping studies
(where participants provide quantitative estimates of verbal expressions) which do not
address how people use probability expressions. Indeed, while there is a great deal of
commentary on the issue (Cliff, 1990; Cohen et al., 1958; Kadane, 1990; Kreuter, 1999;
Mapes, 1979; Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Rothman & Kiviniemi, 1999; Shaw & Dear,
1990; Tanur, 1990), few studies have directly compared verbal and quantitative
expressions (e.g., Erev & Cohen, 1990; Teigen & Brun, 1999; Windschitl & Wells,
1995), and those that have do not show an advantage for quantitative expressions.
Erev and Cohen (1990) had participants rate the attractiveness of gambles on the
outcome of basketball games (e.g., Player 1 will score more than Player 2). These
gambles were accompanied by predictions from an expert (sportswriters and
broadcasters) about the probability o f the event occurring in either a verbal or
quantitative format. They found that while most experts preferred to provide their
estimates verbally, and most participants preferred to receive the estimates quantitatively,
22
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the probability format did not influence which gambles participants preferred to take. On
the other hand, Windschitl and Wells (1995) found that verbal estimates o f being able to
answer an unknown trivia question (participants were given the topic area) were better
predictors of the questions participants chose to answer than quantitative estimates.
They also showed that verbal measures of uncertainty were more sensitive to variations
of psychological uncertainty than numeric measures. Note that this goes against
peoples’ preference for receiving probabilistic information in a quantitative format.
Finally, Teigen and Brun (1999) showed that quantitative estimates of the efficacy of a
proposed treatment for migraines led to more recommendations to undergo the
treatment than when a negative verbal estimate was used (i.e., “quite uncertain”), but
fewer recommendations to undergo the treatment when a positive verbal estimate was
used (i.e., “some possibility of success”).
As can be seen from the above studies, other than decision makers preferring to
receive probabilistic information in quantitative form, as yet, there does not appear to be
any clear consensus concerning what effect, if any, the format of the probability estimate
has. Of the three studies comparing verbal and quantitative expressions, one found no
differences (Erev & Cohen, 1990), one found advantages for verbal expressions
(Windschitl & Wells, 1995), and one found some verbal expressions increased the
number of recommendations to undergo a medical procedure, while other verbal
expressions decreased the number of recommendations (Teigen & Brun, 1999).
Experiment 1 was designed to provide additional evidence on this issue by determining
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how participants interpret and make decisions based on verbal or quantitative
expressions of probability in a medical malpractice trial.
Mapping
In order to compare the effects that the expression of probability has on juror
decisions, one must find the quantitative equivalents of the verbal expressions of
probability® Numerous studies have set out to determine the quantitative equivalents for
various verbal expressions (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Cohen et
al., 1958; Hamm, 1991; Kong et al., 1986; Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967;Mapes, 1979;
Mazur &Merz, 1994a, 1994b; Merz et al., 1991; MosteIIer& Youtz, 1990; Olson &
Budescu, 1997; Reagan, Mosteller, & Youtz, 1989; Shaw & Dear, 1990; Wallsten et al.,
1986; Windschitl & Weber, 1999). Reagan et al. (1989) in reviewing 37 studies over
two decades found that 282 different expressions had been mapped. Even though these
studies used different methodologies (i.e., type of scale used or the order in which terms
were presented) there was considerable agreement in the average ratings for the verbal
expressions (Reagan et al, 1989).
However, one factor has been found to influence the quantitative estimates of
verbal expressions: the context in which the verbal expressions are framed (Hamm, 1991;
Mapes, 1979; Mosteller & Youtz, 1990; Nakao & Axelrod, 1983; Pepper & Prytulak,
1974; Tanur, 1990; Wallsten & Budescu, 1990; Windschitl & Weber, 1999; Winkler,
1990; Wolf, 1990). For example, verbal estimates referring to a medical diagnosis yield

6One could also find the verbal equivalents of quantitative expressions, but the
vast majority of research has focused on the former.
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different numerical estimates than when no referent is provided (Mapes, 1979). One
explanation for this is that while the word meaning stays the same, the word use changes
with the context (Clark, 1990). That is, expressions of probability are relative judgments
and the norm with which we make the comparison changes with the context (i.e., the
norm for tall differs when referring to people than when referring to trees).
Three studies have examined numeric interpretations specifically in patient
populations (Mazur & Merz, 1994a, 1994b; Sutherland et al., 1991). Sutherland et al.
(1991) had cancer patients give a numerical value for 18 word phrases used to describe
risks in connection with fatal and nonfatal outcomes of a viral infection from blood
transfusions. While large variability was found in patients’ numeric interpretations
across all of the word phrases, no significant differences were found due to the severity
(fatal vs. nonfatal) of the outcome. While this could be taken as evidence against context
affecting the interpretations, it was most likely due to the scale they used, as nearly half
of the patients chose the lowest value on the scale. As such, Mazur and Merz (1994a)
found that when more options were included at the low end of the scale used by
Sutherland et al., participants not only assigned lower probabilities but the probability
estimates became lower the more severe the outcome. Thus, they found support for the
context influencing interpretations.
Because of the differences due to the scale used, Mazur and Merz (1994b),
repeated the above study without including a scale. Instead, following the presentation
of the case, patients were asked “1 out of how many patients would have the adverse
outcome if the physician told you the chance o f the outcome was rare?” Again, large
25
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variability was found in patients’ interpretations of verbal expressions of probability with
the probabilities becoming lower the more severe the outcome. This is yet another
example of differences due to the context. They also found that personal characteristics
of the patients influenced their interpretations of the verbal terms. For example, older
patients (above 65 years old) responded with higher probabilities than younger patients
(below 65 years old), and those who perceived themselves to be in extremely good or
very good health responded with lower probabilities than other patients.
In addition to the above empirical studies, Merz et al. (1991) examined the
quantitative equivalents of verbal expressions of probability that were used in actual
informed consent cases. They reviewed appellate and trial court opinions from 1951
through 1989 which included a verbal expression of probability presented by a physician
(either as a defendant or an expert witness) and the corresponding quantitative estimate.
They were able to map 32 expressions in this way. As in the experimental mapping
studies, they found large variability in the interpretation of verbal expressions.
Unfortunately, they did not have enough data to examine the effect the severity of the
injury had on these interpretations.
Iniurv Severity
Jurors have a tendency to be influenced by “extra-legal” factors when deciding
liability and determining damage awards (Bomstein & Rajki, 1994; Cather, Greene, &
Durham, 1996; Feigenson, Park, & Salovey, 1997; Goodman, Greene, & Loftus, 1989;

Hans & Vidmar, 1986) even when they are told that they should not be swayed or
influenced by any sympathy or prejudice for or against any of the parties (Feigenson et
26
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al., 1997; Wright & Ankerman, 1993). One extra-legal factor that has been shown to
affect liability decisions is the severity o f the injury suffered (Bomstein, 1998). The
“severity effect” holds that the greater the harm, the more responsible the person who
caused it (Wallsten, 1966). This finding has been found for both product liability
(Bomstein, 1998) and medical malpractice cases (Bovbjerg et al., 1991). Bomstein
(1998) found that verdicts in favor of the plaintiffwere more likely for those severely
injured, but the effect was mediated by sympathy for the plaintiff (i.e., more severe injury
led to more sympathy for the plaintiff which led to more verdicts in plaintiff’s favor).
Similarly, Feigenson et al., (1997) found that when attributing fault and awarding
damages, participants were especially sensitive to the blameworthiness of the victim
when the consequences of the accident were severe rather than mild.
In a slightly different vein, Caplan, Posner, & Cheney (1991) found that ratings
of appropriateness of care, as judged by anesthesiologists reviewing cases involving
adverse outcomes, changed with the severity of the outcome. In their study, the more
severe the negative outcome the lower the proportion of appropriate care ratings. Note
that these differences due to severity can also be construed as examples of the context
influencing decisions.
While the severity of the injury is considered an extra-legal factor in liability
determinations, compensatory damage awards are expected to be influenced by severity,
and the evidence generally indicates that gross damage awards do roughly correlate with
the severity of the victim’s injury (Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, & Hsieh, 1991; Rodgers, 1991;
Rodriguez & Boggett, 1989; Vidmar, 1995; see Cather, Greene, & Durham, 1996 for an
27
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exception). Brennan, Sox, & Burstin (1996) in reviewing actual malpractice cases found
the severity of the injury to be the only significant predictor of the damage award.
In the above examples, severity has been defined as the negative outcome either
in a products liability case or medical malpractice case. Severity though can also
influence decisions prior to the knowledge of an outcome in its influence on participants’
desire to participate in their treatment decision making (Beisecker, 1988; Blanchard,
Labreque, Ruckdeschel, & Blanchard, 1988; Ende et al., 1989). Ende et al. (1989)
reported that the more serious the hypothetical disease situation, the less patients wanted
to be involved in decisions. This tendency was supported by Blanchard et al. (1988),
who found that those who preferred the health care provider to make the decisions had a
lower performance status (i.e., were more severely injured). This may come about
because as the severity of the illness increases, patients may feel that they do not possess
adequate knowledge concerning the illness to participate effectively in treatment
decision-making (Thompson et al., 1993). This could play an important role in trials in
that jurors will most likely be in better health than patients or plaintiffs, and thus would
want to be more active in their treatment. That being the case, they would most likely
require more information from the physician. Thus, when asked to determine what a
reasonable person would need to know, their reference point may be different from
someone who is ill at the time.
Experiment 1 uses a medical malpractice case to examine if the type of
probability expression used (i.e. verbal or quantitative) influences mock juror decisions.
It will also explore the effect the severity of the injury has in connection with
28
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participants’ interpretation of the probabilities. Finally, because it has been suggested
that the

more severe the possible risk, the lower the threshold for disclosure (Faden &

Beauchamp, 1986), Experiment 1 will also manipulate the probability of the risk.
Hypotheses
Two of the basic requirements for obtaining an informed consent are (1) to
disclose the probable adverse outcomes of medical and/or surgical interventions and (2)
to disclose the risks that are reasonably foreseeable at the time that consent is obtained.
Taken together, these two requirements suggest that physicians should inform the patient
of a risk the more likely that risk is to occur. As such, Hypothesis I states:
Hypothesis 1.1 Mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, award more in
damages, assign the defendant more liability, provide more favorable
ratings of the plaintiff, and rate the plaintiff as being less informed as
the likelihood of the outcome increases.
Note that Hypothesis 1 is a direct test of whether mock jurors follow informed consent
law which previous research in this area has not done.
Previous research has shown that the severity of the injury affects both damage
awards and liability decisions such that the more severe the injury the greater the damage
award and the more liability decisions against the defendant (Bomstein, 1998; Bovbjerg
et al., 1991; Feigenson et al., 1997). As such, Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 1.2 For the more severe injury mock jurors will find the defendant liable
more often, award more in damages, assign the defendant more
liability, have more favorable ratings of the plaintiff and rate the
plaintiff as being less informed.
Previous research is mixed on whether verbal expressions are responded to
differently from quantitative ones. Erev and Cohen (1990) failed to find differences,
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Windschitl and Weils (199S) found an advantage for verbal expressions, and Teigen and
Brun (1999) found quantitative expressions resulted in more recommendations for
treatment than negative verbal expressions, but fewer recommendations than positive
verbal expressions. These findings, coupled with the fact that the task used in the
present study is different from those employed in previous comparisons, provide no clear
basis for how mock jurors will react to probability evidence presented either verbally or
quantitatively. As such, since two of the previous three studies found some type of
difference Hypothesis 3 states:
Hypothesis 1.3 Mock jurors will respond differently to verbal expressions than to
quantitative expressions of probability. However, no predictions will
be made concerning the direction of these differences.
Method
Participants. Participants were S3S undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra
credit for their participation. Sixty-seven percent of the participants were female and
84% were white. The mean age was 18.83 years (SD = 2.63, Mdn = 18).
Design. Experiment 1 is a 2 (severity of injury) x 3 (probability expression) x 3

(base rate) between subjects design. The three levels of probability expression are if the
physician describes non-disclosure of the risk of the plaintiffs injury by using either a
verbal expression of probability, a quantitative expression of probability, or a
combination of both. Previous studies examining verbal expressions experimentally in a
medical context have focused mainly on the interpretation of the word “rare” (Mapes,
1979; Mazur & Merz, 1994a, 1994b). As such, the current experiments will base the
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probability estimations on the word rare and its quantitative equivalent. The verbal
expressions used will be extremely rare for the low base rate of occurrence, rare for the
middle base rate, and uncommon for the high base rate of occurrence. “Uncommon”
was chosen because the median value of its quantitative equivalent is considered to be a
“low” probability of occurrence (as opposed to high occurrence words such as common,
frequent, and great likelihood) by Merz et al. (1991), and is sufficiently different from
“rare’s” equivalent that a difference may be expected.
The quantitative equivalents are 6 out of 10,000 for “extremely rare,” 27 out of
10,000 for “rare,” and 630 out of 10,0007 for “uncommon” as found in Merz, Druzdzel,
and Mazur (1991). The Merz et al. (1991) study is used to determine the quantitative
equivalents because it was the only study that includes all of the verbal phrases used in
this study (the complete Merz et al. mappings are included in the Appendix). However,
it should be noted that the quantitative equivalent to the adjective “rare” used here
(27/10000), is approximately equal to the mean value found across the conditions and
studies o f Mazur and Merz (1994a, 1994b).
The severity of injury is manipulated based on the severity of injury scale used by
Merz (1991). This scale is an ordinal ranking of physical consequences ranging from 1
(infection) to 10 (death) and is very similar to a severity scale developed by Daniels and
Andrews (1989) for the analysis of medical malpractice issues in the 1970s. For this
experiment, two injuries were chosen to represent a moderate and a severe negative
7As is apparent, the magnitude of the difference between rare and extremely rare
is smaller than that between rare and uncommon. Unfortunately, this was necessary due
to the lack of a verbal equivalent of the same difference in magnitude above rare.
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outcome. The moderately severe injury is paresthesia (6 on the severity scale), which is
an abnormal sensation of the body such as numbness, tingling^ or burning. The highly
severe injury is quadriplegia (9 on the severity scale).8 A pilot study asking participants
to rank the severity of these injuries on a 7-point scale verified that quadriplegia (M =
6.56, SD = 0.81, n = 16) is viewed as a more severe outcome than paresthesia (M =
4.71, SD = 1.26, n = 17), t(31) = 4.98, p < .05. The results of this pilot study also
indicated that overall, there was an approximately equal split between liable (47%) and
not liable (53%) verdicts.
Materials. A two-page case summary was chosen for this experiment to ensure
the salience of the reasoning for non-disclosure of the risk of the injury sustained. The
summary is based on an actual case in which the plaintiff successfully sued on a claim of
a lack of informed consent (Gibbons, 1999). The summary includes sections on the facts
of the case, the plaintiffs claims, the defendant’s claims, and a description of informed
consent law. Also included with the case summary is the informed consent form signed
by the plaintiff. This form is one that is currently used by the Earl K. Long Medical
Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The facts of the case include a description of the plaintiff what led her to seek
treatment in the first place, the discovery of a tumor, the decision to undergo surgery to
remove the tumor, the outcome of the surgery (e.g., injury to the spinal cord resulting in

‘Death (10 on the severity scale) was not chosen as the severe outcome because
the trend is for higher damage awards the more severe the injury until death, then there is
a drop in the damages awarded (Bovbjerg et al., 1991). In order to avoid any odd
findings associated with death, the next most severe injury was chosen.
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either paresthesia or quadriplegia), and a statement indicating that the issue for the case
is informed consent, not the competency of the physician during the surgery. The
plaintiffs case states that the physician never informed the plaintiff of the risk of her
injury occurring and produces the consent form which does not list the risk for her injury
as evidence. The defendant’s case describes how much time the physician spent
discussing the surgery with the plaintiff and indicates that the risk was not disclosed
because it does not occur often enough to warrant disclosure.
The description of informed consent law identifies the information required, the
consent standard (what a reasonable person would want to know), and the legal standard
for civil trials (preponderance of the evidence). It also states that if the physician is
found liable, then the plaintiff is entitled to compensation and describes the effects the
injury has had on her life. An ad damnum9 is not included because the manipulation of
the severity o f the injury is expected to produce different damage awards. Previous
research has shown that, when included, the ad damnum is the modal amount awarded
(Chapman & Bomstein, 1996; Goodman et al., 1989; Raitz, Greene, Goodman, &
Loflus, 1990; Zickafoose & Bomstein, 1999). That being the case, if the ad damnum is
kept constant across the severity conditions, then it is likely that no differences in
damage awards would be found between the conditions. Alternatively, if different ad
damnnms

are presented for each severity manipulation, then it will not be clear if

differences are due to the severity of the injury or to participants’ anchoring on the ad
damnum

9An ad damnum is the amount in damages that is requested by the plaintiff.
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Dependent Variables. Participants made their decisions using a verdict form
containing (1) a verdict choice (liable / not liable for malpractice), (2) a total damage
award (for those who found the defendant liable), (3) a determination of the percentage
of responsibility attributed to each party (culpability), (4) a rating of the degree to which
the consent was informed (7-point likert scale) and (5) overall perception ratings of both
the plaintiff and the physician (7-point likert scale). Participants were also asked to rate
their agreement with the following questions (7-point likert scale).
A reasonable person would require to be informed about the potential risk of
quadriplegia (paresthesia) for this surgery, in order to make an informed decision
about whether or not to undergo the procedure.
Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of quadriplegia (paresthesia), she would
NOT HAVE decided to undergo the surgery.
Informed consent statutes require that both o f these statements be responded to in the
affirmative for a physician to be found liable for a lack of informed consent. Participants
were asked for their agreement to these statements for two reasons. First, they serve as
a check to determine if participants conform to the legal prescription. And second, they
help to determine if the defense’s strategy was effective for one statement, but not the
other (i.e., mock jurors may have decided that a reasonable person would want to know
the information, but that it would not have affected the decision to undergo treatment).
Procedure. Participants read the case summary and a copy of the informed
consent form and then completed the verdict form individually. There was no
deliberation, and the entire process took approximately 10-15 minutes.
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Results

The liability judgments were subjected to a logistic regression with expression,
severity, and base rate entered as categorical predictor variables. Due to the
unexpectedly low number of participants returning liable verdicts (39% across all
conditions), there was insufficient sample size for a complete factorial analysis of the
damage awards. As such, participants were collapsed across conditions in order to carry
out planned comparisons of main effects concerning the hypotheses on the natural log of
the damage awards (one-way ANOVAs for base rate and expression of probability, and
an independent t-test for injury severity). The natural log was used to account for the
skewed nature of the data that is expected when damage awards are collected (Cather et
al., 1996; Chapman & Bomstein, 1996; Moller, 1996,1997; Shanley, 1985; Wissler,
Evans, Hart, Morry, & Saks, 1997; Zickafoose and Bomstein, 1999).10 All other
dependent variables were subjected to a 2x3x3 between subjects ANOVA.
Hypothesis 1.1 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often,
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability (culpability), provide more
favorable ratings of the plaintiff, and rate the plaintiff as being less informed as the
likelihood of the outcome increases. The base rate of the injury occurring did not
significantly effect any of these variables. See Table 1 for means and significance levels.
The ratings of how informed the plaintiffwas marginally significant though with post-hoc

10Analyses were also conducted on the median (of the raw damage awards)
amounts awarded. While these analyses did not result in different findings the medians
will be provided for illustrative purposes.
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Table 1. Means (standard deviations), cell sizes, and significance levels for base rate.
Base Rate

Liability
Decision

Culpability

Impression
of Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Informedness

Damage Award

Ratings of
Injury Severity

Low

.35
n = 172

55.83
(24.90)
n = 169

3.83
(1.16)
n = 176

505,
(1.23)
n = 175

12.25
(2.25)
n = 55

5.91.
(1.26)
n = 175

Middle

.40
n = 174

55.50
(25.80)
n = 167

3.99
(1.22)
n = 177

4.89,b
(1.37)
n = 175

12.36
(1.95)
n = 68

5.71,
(1.15)
n = 176

High

.43
n = 178

56.18
(27.37)
n = 177

3.76
(1.32)
n = 182

4.73b
(1.42)
n = 180

12.06
(2.23)
n = 76

5.46b
(1.40)
n= 182

Sign.

g’s < .75
E’s > ,15

F(2,495) = 0.03
E = .97

F(2,517)= 1.69
E=.19

F(2,512) = 2.58
.05 < p < .10

F(2,196) = .291
E=.75

F(2,515) = 7.84
E < .001

Note. Within a column, means with same subscript are not significantly different from each other at e < .05. Damage
awards are in the form of the natural log.

analyses indicating that the plaintiff was rated as being significantly more informed in the
low base condition than the high base rate condition (t(355) = 2.25, £ < .05, q2 = .010).
The middle base rate condition was not significantly different from either of the other
base rate conditions (t’s < 1.18, £*s > .24).
Interestingly, the base rate of the injury occurring did significantly affect the
ratings of the severity of the injury, F(2,515) = 7.84, £ < .05, q2 = .03. Here, the high
base rate condition was rated as significantly less severe than the low base rate condition,
t(357) = 3.96, £ < .001, and the middle base rate condition, t(358) = 2.19, £ < .05. The
difference between the low and middle conditions was marginally significant, t(351) =
1.76, .05 < £ < .10. See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations.
In other words, while the base rate did not directly impact the liability,
culpability, or damage awards, it did influence perceptions of the severity of the injury
and ratings of how informed the patient was.
Hypothesis 1.2 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often,
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability, have more favorable ratings
of the plaintiff, and rate the plaintiff as being less informed as the injury becomes more
severe. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. The severity of the
injury was found to be a significant predictor of the liability decision, £ = 1.39, £ < .05,
with participants finding the defendant liable more often when the surgery resulted in
quadriplegia (45%) than when it resulted in paresthesia (33%). There was also a
significant main effect for defendant culpability, F(l,495) = 4.47, £ < .05, q2 = .009, with
participants finding the defendant more culpable when the surgery resulted in
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Table 2. Means (standard deviations), cell sizes, and significance levels for injury severity.

u>
00

Injury
Severity

Liability
Decision

Culpability

Impression
of Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Informedness

Damage
Award

Ratings of
Injury Severity

Moderate

.33
n = 262

53.37
(25.91)
n = 258

3.75
(1.20)
n = 267

4.98
(1.35)
n = 265

11.81
(1.97)
n = 82

5.01
(1.23)
n = 268

Severe

.45
n = 262

58.35
(25.94)
n = 255

3.97
(1.27)
n = 268

4.79
(1.35)
n = 265

12.49
(2.21)
n = 117

6.38
(0.94)
n = 265

Sign.

(3= 1.39
E < ,05

F(l,495) = 4.47
E< .05

F(l,517) = 4.46
E< .05

F(l,512) = 2.53
R= 11

t(197) - 2.22
E<.05

F(l,515) = 212.73
E< .001

quadriplegia, as opposed to paresthesia. This main effect was qualified by a the threeway interaction, F(4,495) = 2.82, p < .05, if = .022, which indicated that severity only
had an effect in the high base rate condition when a quantitative expression of probability
was used (either alone, t(60) = 1.86, p = .03, severe: M = 58.87, SD = 26.98, n = 31;
moderate: M = 45.71, SD = 28.62, n = 31) or in conjunction with a verbal expression
t(51) —3.23, p < .001, severe: M = 69.90, SD = 23.30, n = 29; moderate: M = 46.24,
SD = 31.76, n = 29). See Figure 1 for graph. The severity of the injury was also found
to have a main effect for ratings of the overall impression of the plaintiff F(l,517) =
4.46, p < .05, q2= .009, with the plaintiff receiving higher ratings when the injury was
more severe.
Again, due to the limited number of participants awarding damages, the data

were collapsed across conditions in order to assess Hypothesis 1.2.11 As expected,
participants awarded significantly more in damages when the surgery resulted in
quadriplegia (M = $1,641,291; SD = $5,110,164; Mdn = $500,000), than paresthesia (M
= $782,040; SD = $2,014,634; Mdn = $100,000), t(197) = 2.22, p < .05, rf = .018.
Contrary to expectations, severity did not significantly effect the ratings of how
informed the plaintiff was, F(l,512) = 2.53, p = .11, although, the means were in the
expected direction.
Hypothesis 1.3 predicted that mock jurors would respond differently to verbal
expressions than to quantitative expressions of probability. Contrary to expectations,

“None of the other main effects or interactions were significant in the full
factorial analysis paving the way for collapsing across conditions.
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Figure 1. Three way interaction for defendant culpability.
Note. Significant differences between the moderate and severe injuries are indicated by conditions with the *.

how the probabilities were communicated did not reach significance for any of the
dependent variables (see Table 3 for means and levels of significance). However, for all
the dependent variables, except verdict choice (same percent voting liable), there was a
tendency for verbal expressions alone to result in higher scores than the quantitative
expressions alone.
Components of Liability. In order to ensure that participants were not treating
the questions concerning the two conditions necessary for finding the defendant liable as
tapping the same underlying construct, the correlation was computed between them.
Since this correlation was fairly low, r = .23, it appears that participants treated them as
two independent questions, and responses to each question were therefore subjected to
separate 2x3x3 between subjects ANOVAs. As with the liability judgments and
culpability ratings, there was a main effect of injury, F(l,517) = 4.02, £ < .05, q2 = .008,
for agreement with the statement that “A reasonable person would require to be
informed about the potential risk of quadriplegia (paresthesia) in order to make an
informed decision about whether or not to undergo the surgery.” Again, participants
agreed with the statement more when the injury was severe (M = 5.11, SD = 1.79), than
when the injury was moderate (M = 4.80, SD = 1.76). No other main effects or
interactions were significant for this variable.
There were no significant main effects or interactions concerning agreement with
the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of quadriplegia (paresthesia) she
would not have decided to undergo the surgery.”
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Table 3. Means (standard deviations), cell sizes, and significance levels according to the expression of probability used.
Liability
Decision

Culpability

Impression
of Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Informedness

Damage Award

Verbal

.36
n = 172

57.89
(24.06)
n = 167

3.97
(121)
n = 176

4.94
(1.28)
n = 174

12.22
(2.31)
n = 61

Quantitative

.36
n = 178

52.52
(27.21)
n = 172

3.82
(1.26)
n = 180

4.88
(1.37)
n = 178

11.99
(2.15)
n = 64

Both

.46
n = 174

57.16
(26.45)
n = 174

3.79
(1.24)
n = 179

4.85
(1.40)
n = 178

12.40
(1.98)
n = 74

Significance

|3’s<.82
£>’s > .12

F(2,495) = 2.23
f i =. l l

F(2,517)= 1.18
p=.32

F(2,512) = .171
2 = .84

F(2,196) = ,604
fi=.55

Probability
Expression

Note. Median damage awards were $250,000, $100,000, and $250,000 for verbal, quantitative, and both respectively.

Manipulation Check. Participants were asked to rate the severity of the
plaintiffs injury after the surgery (7 point scale) as a check on the injury severity

manipulation. The responses were subjected to the same 2x3x3 between subjects
ANOVA as the rest of the data. As in the pilot studies, quadriplegia (M = 6.3 8, SD =
.94) was seen as more severe than paresthesia (M = 5.01. SD = 1.23), F(l, 515) =
212.71, £ < .05. Interestingly, there was also a significant main effect of base rate for
the severity ratings. This finding was described above in relation to Hypothesis 1.1.
Supplementary Analyses. Mackauf (1999) has claimed that jurors are willing to
forgive almost any malpractice if they like the health care provider (i.e., find him/her to
be caring, competent, and compassionate). However, if jurors do not like the health care
provider (i.e., find him/her to be arrogant, lazy, or incompetent), they will find against
him/her even if no malpractice occurred. If this is true, then one would expect that those
deciding in favor of the plaintiff (defendant liable) would also have a better overall
impression of her, while those deciding in favor of the defendant (defendant not liable)
would also have a better overall impression of him. This is exactly what was found.
Participants voting liable had a higher overall impression of the plaintiff t(521) = 12.88,
p < .05 (liable: M = 4.61, SD = 1.13, n = 206; not liable: M = 3.37, SD = 1.04, n = 317),
while those who voted not liable had a higher overall impression of the defendant, t(519)
= 12.54, £ < .05 (not liable: M = 4.63, SD = 1.01, n = 316; liable: M = 3.47, SD = 1.05,
n = 205).
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Discussion
Previous research has indicated that decision makers prefer to receive
probabilistic information in quantitative terms (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Olson & Budescu,
1997; Shaw & Dear, 1990). This is thought to be so because quantitative expressions
are more precise and informative. Experiment 1 set out to determine if the format of
probabilistic information influenced juror decisions. The results of Experiment 1 suggest
that the manner in which probabilistic information is communicated (i.e., verbally or
quantitatively) does not influence liability, damage awards, or culpability decisions.
While this finding is consistent with the results of Erev and Cohen (1990), who failed to
find a difference between verbal and quantitative expressions of predictions when rating
the attractiveness of gambles on the outcomes o f basketball games, it is inconsistent with
other findings (Teigen & Brun, 1999; Windschitl & Wells, 1995).
The current study is conceptually similar to that of Teigen and Brun (1999),
which asked participants to recommend whether a patient should undergo treatment
(acupuncture for migraines) based on the estimate of the efficacy of the proposed
treatment. This is akin to the component of liability question concerning whether or not
the defendant would have had the surgery had she been given the risk information.
Teigen and Brun found that when using negative expressions, quantitative estimates
resulted in more recommendations for treatment than verbal estimates. They proposed
that positive verbal expressions suggest behaviors in line with the target outcome,
whereas negative expressions suggest opposite behaviors. In their study, negative verbal
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expressions would suggest that the treatment was unlikely to succeed, thereby resulting
in fewer recommendations to undergo the treatment.
Following their description of what are positive (i.e., “some possibility”) and
negative (i.e., “quite uncertain”) verbal expressions, the verbal expressions used in the
current experiment (i.e., “extremely rare”, “rare”, “uncommon”) would be considered
negative expressions. However, the current study differs from that of Teigen and Brun
(1999) in that their referent was the likelihood of success of the treatment, while in the
current study, the referent was the likelihood of the occurrence of a negative side effect.
This effectively reverses the predictions that would be made. For example, if a negative
verbal expression suggests that the opposite would occur, one would assume that
patients given a negative verbal expression concerning a negative outcome would
consider it unlikely for that negative outcome to occur. Thus, it would be expected that
participants receiving negative verbal estimates would be more likely to suggest that the
patient would have still undergone the surgery, had she been told of the consequences.
The results of the current study, however, do not support this finding. Not only
was the F-test not significant in the overall model, F(2,515) = 2.39, p > .05, but the
means reflect the opposite pattern of what Teigen and Brun (1999) would predict, with
higher ratings of agreement that the defendant would have had the surgery anyway in the
quantitative expression condition (M = 3.12, SD = 1.81, n = 179) than in the verbal
expression condition (M = 3.31. SD = 1.81, n = 176).12

12Note that for this question, lower values reflect more agreement.
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A possible reason for the difference between the current study and that of Teigen
and Brun (1999) could be the seriousness of the treatment choice involved. In Teigen
and Brun, the choice concerned treatment for the relief of migraines. In the current
study, the treatment was to remove a tumor. The latter may be a more serious condition
resulting in nearly everyone recommending surgery no matter what. Indeed, the means
in both conditions suggest that she would have had the surgery. Thus, repeating the
current study with a less serious initial condition, thereby making the option of non
treatment more acceptable, might lead to a replication of the results of Teigen and Brun.
A second goal of Experiment 1 was to examine what effect the severity of the
injury has on juror decisions. A great deal of evidence exists suggesting that injury
severity influences decisions even when it is not supposed to (Bomstein, 1998; Bovbjerg
et al., 1991; Feigenson et aL, 1997; Wallsten, 1966). This is exactly what was found,
with the more severe injury resulting in more liability decisions, higher culpability ratings,
larger damage awards, and better overall impressions of the plaintiff. The severe injury
also resulted in higher rates of agreement that a reasonable person would have wanted to
know of the risk of the injury. However, injury severity did not influence ratings of
whether the plaintiff would have still undergone the surgery had she known of the risk.
It should be noted, though, that the effect of injury severity was marginally significant
(F(l,515) = 3.45, .05 < g < .10), with participants indicating that the plaintiff would be
somewhat less likely to have had the surgery when the injury was severe (M = 3.47, SD
= 1.88, n = 268) than when it was moderate (M = 3.18. SD = 1.85, n = 265).
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A third goal was to examine what effect the base rate of the injury occurring has
on juror decisions. Since possible complications should be disclosed the more likely an
injury is to occur, it was expected that mock jurors would find the defendant more liable
and award more in damages as the base rate increased. While the trend in liability
decisions followed this pattern, it did not reach significance (damage awards did not
follow this pattern). One possibility for this lack of significance is that the base rate
manipulation may not have registered. That is, participants may not have been able to
distinguish between the various base rate levels. Siegrist (1997) suggests that people
interpret probabilities as either low or high, and that it is difficult for them to get an
accurate feeling for the specific level of the risk. Likewise, Camerer and Kunreuther
(1989) state that people ignore risks that fall below a certain threshold (anything below
that threshold is viewed as the same). It could be that all 3 base rates were considered
below this cutoff and were thus indistinguishable from each other. However, no
manipulation check was included to ascertain this possibility.
Finally, Experiment 1 examined Mackauf s (1999) claim that juror decisions are
in part based on how much they like the physician (i.e., find him/her to be caring
competent, and compassionate). Consistent with this claim, it was found that those
voting liable also had higher overall ratings of the plaintiff, while those voting not liable
had higher overall ratings of the defendant. Because the liability decision was not
manipulated, we cannot make a direct causal connection between the two, but this
information does provide evidence in support of Mackauf s claims.
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Experiment 2: Frequency vs. Percentage
Experiment 1 examined whether mock jurors respond differently to probabilities
expressed verbally than to probabilities expressed quantitatively. Even though no
differences were found in juror responses, the ambiguity inherent in verbal expressions
has led many commentators to suggest that health care providers should at least include
a quantitative expression when discussing uncertain outcomes, if for no other reason
than to improve patient comprehension (Merz et al., 1991; Merz et al., 1993; Nakao &
Axelrod, 1983; Olson & Budescu, 1997; Shaw & Dear, 1990). The question then
becomes, are all quantitative expressions created equally? The short answer is “no.”
Previous research has found that participants respond differently to quantitatively
equivalent information presented in different probability formats (Cosmides & Tooby,
1996; Gigerenzer & Hoflfrage, 1995; Siegrist, 1997; Slovic et al., 2000; Tversky &
Koehler, 1994).
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995) claim that Bayesian algorithms are
computationally simpler when probabilistic information is presented as frequencies rather
than as percentages. Information presented as frequencies requires fewer operations, the
operations can be performed on whole numbers rather than fractions, only two kinds of
information need to be attended to (three are required for percentages),13and the
information about sample size included in frequencies allows for inferences beyond single
point estimates. They presented participants with hundreds of Bayesian problems and
“Frequencies only require d&h and d&-h (where d=data and h=hypothesis).
Percentages require p(H), p(D|H), and p(D|-H) (often called base rate, hit rate, and false
alarm rate respectively)
48
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found that statistically naive participants responded in a Bayesian manner in nearly 50%
o f the problems when probability information was presented as a frequency. This finding
is contrary to the findings of much of the heuristics and biases research (most of which
present probability information in the form of percentages), which typically finds less
than 20% of the responses conforming to Bayesian reasoning (Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1972). Mellers and McGraw (1999) agree with
Gigerenzer and Hofirage (1995) that frequencies can improve Bayesian reasoning, but
they also show that the base rate plays an important role. They found that probabilities
are more difficult to understand than frequencies, especially when events are rare, thus
leading to worse Bayesian reasoning.
Cosmides & Tooby (1996) extended these findings using the following medical
diagnosis problem:
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false
positive rate of 5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a
positive result actually has the disease, assuming that you know nothing
about the person’s symptoms or signs?
% (Cosmides and Tooby,
1996, p. 21)14
This problem is well known in the heuristics and biases literature for eliciting base rate
neglect, even from technically educated participants such as the faculty, staff, and fourth
year students at Harvard Medical School (Casscells, Schoenberger, & Graboys, 1978).
Cosmides & Tooby found that by expressing the problem in frequency terms (i.e.,
l4The correct answer is 2%, but only if one assumes that the true positive rate is
100% (this information was not provided in the original problem), that the population
base rate is the appropriate prior probability, and that the individual tested was randomly
drawn from the population. If the participant believes any of these assumptions to be
false, then other answers are correct according to Bayes’ Theorem.
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replaced ‘false positive rate of 5%’ with ‘out of every 1000 people who are perfectly
healthy, 50 of them test positive for the disease’), 76% of participants showed correct
Bayesian reasoning (92% of participants showed Bayesian reasoning in their most
ecologically valid condition). Interestingly, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) also found that
when just frequency information was presented participants were more likely to engage
in Bayesian reasoning than if the information was presented in both frequency and
percentages form. This suggests that not only would frequency information aid Bayesian
reasoning, but that percentage information might actually hinder it. Some of the other
cognitive biases that have been shown to disappear when frequency information is used
include the conjunction fallacy (Fiedler, 1988) and overconfidence (Gigerenzer et al.,
1991).
In a slightly different vein, Siegrist (1997) presented participants with information
about the risk of dying from taking a certain medication (either as a frequency or a
probability). He found that the risk format and base rate interacted, such that differences
due to the base rate only occurred when the information was presented as a frequency (6
in 1,000,000). When presented as a probability (.000006), there was no difference
between the base rates. He concluded that frequency information emphasizes the threat
of the risk, and therefore should be used when comprehension of the danger is important.
Alternatively, if one wishes to downplay the differences between risk levels, one should
present information as a probability.
Presenting information as either a percentage or frequency has also been found to
influence mock juror decisions (Thompson & Schumann, 1987). Thompson &
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Schumann (1987) had participants read an account of a liquor store robbery, and then
determine the suspect’s degree of guilt (on a scale from 0-100%) both prior to, and
following, the testimony of a forensic expert. The expert testified that a sample of the
suspect’s hair was microscopically indistinguishable from a hair found inside the robber’s
ski mask. The expert also described the probability that two hairs drawn at random from
different people would be indistinguishable. They found that ratings of guilt were higher
when the expert’s description was as a percentage (i.e., only a 2% chance the
defendant’s hair would match the perpetrator’s if he were innocent) than when the expert
included frequency information in his description (i.e., added to the conditional
probability that in a city of 1,000,000 people, 20,000 people would have hair with the
same characteristics). The authors suggest that the frequency information encouraged
participants to think about the large number of other individuals who could have
matched the perpetrator’s hair, thereby reducing the likelihood of his guilt.
The above studies have shown that the format of mathematically equivalent
information can affect responses across a wide variety of tasks (Cosmides & Tooby,
1996; Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer & Hofirage, 1995; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Thompson
& Schumann, 1987). Experiment 2 is designed to ascertain if the format of probability
evidence presented in a medical malpractice trial influences mock juror decisions (i.e.,
liability decisions and damage awards). To do this, participants are presented with the
same malpractice case as used in Experiment 1, with the probabilities for why the
information was not disclosed presented as either a frequency, a percentage, or a
combination of both. It should be noted that using an informed consent case not only
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extends this comparison of frequencies and percentages into a new domain (civil trials),
but the manner in which the probabilistic information is used differs greatly from its use
in cases involving associative evidence (i.e., matching blood samples, hair samples, and
fiber samples to a suspect).
Hypotheses
As in Experiment 1, it is expected that the more likely the injury is to occur, the
less favorable decisions will be to the defendant
Hypothesis 2.1 Mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, award more in
damages, assign the defendant more liability, rate the plaintiff as having
been less informed, and provide more favorable ratings of the plaintiff
as the likelihood of the outcome increases.
Thompson and Schumann (1987) found that DNA evidence presented as
percentages resulted in more guilty verdicts than when presented as frequencies. This
result was also found by Koehler and Macchi (1999; as cited in Slovic et al., 2000). The
above studies focused on the probability that the suspect was innocent given a match.
The explanation provided for the differences is that it is easier to imagine similar
alternatives (i.e., other people matching) when probabilistic information is presented as a
frequency, thereby making the match appear more likely to have occurred by chance. In
the current study, if the frequency format makes it easier to imagine similar alternatives,
then the risk of the injury occurring will be viewed as more likely to happen. That being
the case, Hypothesis 2 of Experiment 2 states:
Hypothesis 2.2 Mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often, award more in
damages, assign the defendant more liability, rate the plaintiff as having
been less informed, and provide more favorable ratings of the plaintiff
when the risk information is provided as a frequency.
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Siegrist (1997) found that the presentation of risk information and the base rate
interacted such that differences due to base rates were only found when probabilistic
information was presented as a frequency. Similarly, Mellers & McGraw (1999) found
that probabilities are more difficult to understand than frequencies, and thus not as easily
differentiated when events are rare. Thus, Hypothesis 2 for Experiment 2 predicts an
interaction between probability format and base rate such that:
Hypothesis 2.3 Differences between base rates will occur only when the probabilistic
information is presented as a frequency. No differences between base
rates are expected when presented as a percentage.
Method
Participants. Participants were 179 undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra
credit for their participation. Seventy percent were female and 81% were white. The
mean age was 19.51 years (SD = 3.34, Mdn = 19).
Design Experiment 2 is a 3 (type of expression) x 3 (base rate) between subjects

design. The three types of expression are either the probability of the risk occurring
expressed as a frequency, a percentage, or a combination of both. Three levels are used
for the base rate condition (3%, .3%, .03%, and 3 in 100, 3 in 1,000,3 in 10,000).
Because previous studies examining probabilistic information and informed consent have
focused on “rare” occurrences (generally indicated by describing the likelihood of the
event as rare) the frequencies chosen for this experiment are based on the quantitative
equivalent for the word “rare” (.0027) as found by Merz et al. (1991).
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Materials. The same case summary and informed consent form is used as in
Experiment 1 with the only changes being how the probabilities are expressed.
Dependent Variables & Procedure. The same dependent variables and procedure
as in Experiment 1 are used.
Results
As in Experiment 1, the liability judgments were subjected to a logistic regression
with expression and base rate entered as categorical predictor variables. Due to the
unexpectedly low number of participants returning liable verdicts (28% across all
conditions) there was insufficient sample size for a complete factorial analysis of the
damage awards. As such, participants were collapsed across conditions in order to carry
out planned comparisons concerning the hypotheses on the natural log of the damage
awards (one-way ANOVAs for base rate, and independent t-test for expression of
probability). All other dependent variables were subjected to 2x3 between subjects
ANOVAs.
Hypothesis 2.1 is the same as in Experiment 1 and states that mock jurors will
find the defendant liable more often, award more in damages, assign the defendant more
liability, rate the plaintiff as having been less informed, and provide more favorable
ratings of the plaintiff as the likelihood of the outcome increases. As in Experiment 1,
the base rate of the injury occurring did not significantly affect any of these variables
(liability decisions: £’s < .44, p’s > .30; damage awards: F(2,41) = 0.06, p = .94;
defendant culpability: F(2,164) = 0.63, p = .53; overall rating of the plaintiff: F(2,173) =
0.47, p = .63; plaintiff informedness: F(2,171) = 1.89, p = .16).
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Hypothesis 2.2 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often,
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability, rate the plaintiff as having
been less informed, and provide more favorable ratings of the plaintiff when the risk
information is provided as a frequency. Contrary to expectations, the format of the risk
information did not influence any of these variables (liability decisions: {3= 0.13, p = .70;
damage awards: t(42) = 1.02, p = .32;ISdefendant culpability: F(l,164) = 1.60, p = .21;
overall rating of the plaintiff: F(l,173) = 0.17, p = .68; plaintiff informedness: F(l,171) =
0.02, p = .90).
Hypothesis 2.3 predicts an interaction between probability format and base rate
such that differences between base rates will only occur when the probabilistic
information is presented as a frequency. No differences between base rates are expected
when presented as a percentage. As with the main effects, and contrary to what was
predicted, the interaction between probability format and base rate was not significant
for any of the dependent variables (liability decisions: £’s < 0.44, p’s > .30; damage
awards: F(2,38) = 1.20, p = .31;16defendant culpability: F(2,164) = 0.19, p= .82; overall
rating of the plaintiff: F(2,173) = 0.40, p = .67; plaintiff informedness: F(2,171) = 0.23, p
= .80).
Components of Liability. As in Experiment 1, the two questions concerning the

conditions necessary for finding the defendant liable were subjected to 2x3 between
ISMedian damage awards were $100,000 and $50,000 for percent and frequency
respectively.
I6Note that cell sizes ranged from 3 to 9 for this analysis, so the interpretation of
the results must be tempered.
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subjects ANOVAs.17 As with the liability judgments and culpability ratings there were
no significant main effects nor an interaction (F’s < 1, j)’s > .35) for agreement with the
statement that “A reasonable person would require to be informed about the potential
risk o f quadriplegia (paresthesia) in order to make an informed decision about whether
or not to undergo the surgery.”
However, there was a significant main effect of base rate, F(2,173) = 3.14, £ <
.05, T|2 = .035, for agreement with the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk

of paresthesia she would not have decided to undergo the surgery.” Tukey’s LSD post
hoc analyses indicated that participants disagreed with the statement more in the low (3
in 10,000/.03%) base rate condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.73) than they did for the either
the middle (3 in 1000/.3%) condition (M = 3.36. SD = 1.82), t(l 18) = 2.31, £ < .05, or
the high (3 in 100/3%) condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.95), t(l 19) = 1.99, £ < .05. There
was no difference between the middle and high base rate conditions, t(l 18) < 1.
Supplementary Analyses. As in Experiment 1, analyses were conducted to verify
the claim of Mackauf (1999) that jurors are willing to forgive almost any malpractice if
they like the health care provider (i.e., find him/her to be caring, competent, and
compassionate). However, ifjurors do not like the health care provider (i.e., find
him/her to be arrogant, lazy, or incompetent), they will find against him/her even if no
malpractice occurred. Again, evidence was found supporting this claim. Participants

l7As in Experiment 1 the correlation between the two components was low, r =
.31, suggesting that participants were not treating the two questions as the same, thereby
allowing for each question to be analyzed separately.
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voting liable had a higher overall impression of the plaintiff t(171) = 5.90, £ < .05
(liable: M = 4.31, SD = 1.06; not liable: M = 3.38, SD = 0.89), while those who voted
not liable had a higher overall impression of the defendant, t(169) = 6.44, p < .05 (not
liable: M = 4.71, SD = 0.96; liable: M = 3.63, SD = 1.02).
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment I investigating Mackauf s
(1999) claims that liability decisions are related to one’s liking of the physician. As in
Experiment 1, participants who voted liable also had a better overall impression of the
plaintiffj while those who voted not liable had a better overall impression of the
defendant.
Experiment 2's main goal of replicating previous research that has found
differences when probabilistic information is presented as frequencies, as opposed to
percentages, was not successful. While previous research has shown frequency
information to increase Bayesian reasoning (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995), reduce cognitive biases (Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer et al., 1991),
influence medical decisions (Siegrist, 1997), and reduce the number of guilty verdicts in
a criminal trial (Thompson & Schumann, 1987), Experiment 2 failed to find any
differences in liability decisions, culpability ratings, damage awards, overall impression of
the plaintiff, or ratings of how informed the plaintiff was due to the format of the
probabilistic information (frequency vs. percentage). In particular, the results cast doubt
on Siegrist’s (1997) suggestion that frequency information emphasizes the risk and thus
should be used when comprehension of the danger is important. If this is the case, then
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one would expect that in a medical malpractice trial concerning a lack of informed
consent, the frequency information would emphasize the threat of the non-disclosed risk
resulting in more judgments against the physician/defendant. However, this was not the
case, as no differences were found due to the probability format.
One possibility for the failure to replicate is that the current study uses a different
task (i.e., a civil trial) from any of the previous research. However, the conceptual
similarities between the criminal trial of Thompson and Schumann (1987) and the civil
trial used in the current study would suggest this is not the case. In both trials
probabilistic evidence was presented-hair matching in Thompson and Schumann (1987),
and testimony describing why risk information was not disclosed in the current
study-and a verdict choice was made (guilt or liability). Thus, the underlying structure
of the two studies is similar enough to expect consistent findings. In spite of these
similarities, there may be something special about medical malpractice trials. For
example, medical malpractice trials typically result in more verdicts in favor of the
defendant than other civil trials. Plaintiffs have been found to win only about 20-33% of
malpractice trials, while they win between 44-50% of product liability trials (Moller,
1996; Taragin, Willett, Wilczek, Trout, & Carson, 1992). It may be that there is a bias

favoring physicians that overrides any effects that the probability format would exert.
There is also evidence that malpractice cases result in higher damage awards than other
types of cases (Bovbjerg et al., 1991; Chin & Peterson, 1985; Hammitt, Carroll, &
Relies, 1985); however, Vidmar (1993,1995) has provided persuasive evidence
countering those claims. Even so, expanding the current studies to cover other types of
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civil trials (e.g., product liability) may have more success replicating the previous
research.
Another possibility concerning the discrepancy in findings revolves around the
explanation that Thompson and Schumann (1987) provided for their results. They
suggest that frequency information encourages participants to think about the large
number o f other individuals who could have matched the perpetrator’s hair. Thus, not
only does the frequency information force participants to consider the base rate, it
suggests that the numbers used in the numerator of the frequency play an important role.
That is, the larger the number in the numerator, the more alternatives one is able to
generate. In the current study, that would suggest that the larger the numerator, the
more times one could imagine the complication actually occurring resulting in more
decisions against the physician-defendant. In the current experiment, though, the
numerator in the frequency information stayed constant (it was always three), while the
denominator was adjusted to manipulate the base rate of occurrence. It could be that
participants ignored the denominator and focused on the numerator. This is similar to
the idea o f psychological uncertainty, which refers to the concept that mathematically
equivalent ratios can take on different meanings when the numbers making up the ratio
are altered. This concept is more fully addressed in Experiment 3.
As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was unsuccessful in eliciting an effect of base
rate for liability decisions or damage awards. Again, no manipulation check was
included, so it is not clear if participants were able to distinguish between the different
base rates. Thus, future studies should ensure that the base rates are being attended to.
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A final finding concerns the agreement with the two statements composing the
components of liability. As in Experiment 1, the format of the expression of probability
did not influence agreement levels with either the statement “A reasonable person would
require to be informed about the potential risk of paresthesia...” or the statement “Had
Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of paresthesia, she would not have decided to undergo
the surgery.” However, participants did agree with the second statement more in the
high base rate condition than the low base rate condition. This finding was not found in
Experiment 1. However, this may be due to the fact that in Experiment 1, the low base
rate condition was based on a verbal equivalent which was not as low as the low base
rate used in Experiment 2. Thus, Experiment l's manipulation may not have been
sensitive enough to obtain this difference.
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Experiment 3: Psychological Uncertainty
It has been argued that people naturally represent probabilistic information in
frequencies (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hasher & Zacks,
1979; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). It has further been shown that certain cognitive biases
(i.e., base rate neglect and conjunction fallacy) can be eliminated when probabilities are
expressed as frequencies instead of as percentages (Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer et al.,
1991). However, Experiment 2 was unable to find a difference between frequencies and
percentages. One possibility for the lack of a difference in Experiment 2 is that not all
frequencies are created equal, and thus the frequencies used were not sufficient to elicit
differences. If that is the case, then one should be able to obtain different responses to
different expressions of the same frequencies.
The absolute size of the numbers used to represent a frequency has been shown
to influence decisions (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland,
1989; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). In examining this issue, participants are typically
presented with two buckets containing the same ratio of winning tickets but with
different absolute numbers (e.g., 1 in 10 or 10 in 100 are winners). Participants are then
asked to indicate which bucket they would prefer to draw from. The typical finding is
that participants would rather draw from the bucket containing 10 winning tickets out of
100 than from the bucket containing 1 winning ticket out of 10, even though they realize
that the odds are the same for both buckets (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et al.,
1989). This differential response rate has led to the conclusion that mathematically
equivalent ratios can be psychologically different, and has been called “psychological
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uncertainty” (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et aL, 1989; Windschitl & Wells,
1996).
Kirkpatrick & Epstein (1992), using the lottery task described above, found that
both the ratio of winners (either 10% or 90%), and whether the task was framed as
drawing a winning or losing ticket, influenced the decision. When participants could win
or lose real money, participants preferred to draw from the bowl with more tickets when
10% were winners (i.e., preferred 10/100 to 1/10), and from the bowl with fewer tickets
when 90% were winners (i.e., preferred 9/10 to 90/100). When framed in terms of a
losing ticket, participants preferred to draw from the bowl with more tickets when 90%
were losers, and to draw from the bowl with fewer tickets when 10% were losers. Thus,
the framing of the information reversed the preference pattern. This finding is consistent
with previous research on the framing of information in which most people are risk
averse when information is framed in terms of gains, but are more likely to select a risky
option when information is framed in terms of losses (Kuehberger, 1998; Levin,
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998)
One explanation provided for framing effects revolves around the ability to
imagine alternative outcomes (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller et al., 1989). After
learning of an outcome, participants imagine the ways a similar outcome (or opposite
outcome depending on which is made salient) might have occurred. The ease with which
alternatives can be imagined determines the normality of an event, with abnormal events
evoking more surprise, distress, and suspicion than normal ones (Miller et al., 1989).
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One might suggest that framing effects only occur when the task is not
meaningful to participants, and thus, they do not actively examine the issue (Lauver &
Rubin, 1990; Llewellyn-Thomas, McGreal, & Thiel, 1995; Siminoff & Fetting, 1989;
Wilson, Wallston, & King, 1990). As such, framing presumably would not play a
significant role in patients’ decisions regarding their own health, assuming their health is
meaningful to them. A number of studies, though, have found that the framing of
options does influence hypothetical medical decisions. These decisions include choosing
to undergo surgery (Rybash & Roodin, 1989; Wilson, Kaplan, & Schneiderman, 1987),
choosing to abort a child affected with haemophilia (Wilson et al., 1987), choosing
whether to become pregnant based on the probability of the child having a serious heart
abnormality (McNeil, Pauker, & Tversky, 1988), and choosing between drug treatments
(Kuhn, 1997). Thus, it appears that how information is presented to the patient can have
a substantial impact on the decision made.
In an informed consent case jurors are presented with the outcome (some injury
to the patient) and are expected to determine if the occurrence of the injury was
foreseeable, thereby requiring the risk of that injury to have been disclosed. If the health
care provider had not disclosed that information, his/her defense will most likely be
based on why it was not disclosed. Consequently, the absolute numbers used by the
physician in describing the probability (in frequency terms) of the injury occurring may
cause mock jurors to view mathematically equivalent probabilities as more or less likely
to occur, which in turn, could affect judgments of liability.
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Experiment 3 examines how psychological uncertainty (PU) affects mock juror
decisions by manipulating the magnitude o f the numbers composing the frequency used
to describe the risk of an injury occurring. It is expected that high psychological
uncertainty will result in decisions more favorable to the plaintiff, while low
psychological uncertainty will result in decisions more favorable to the defendant.
Experiment 3 also examines if framing the frequencies in terms of the likelihood of an
injury occurring versus the likelihood of an injury not occurring influences mock juror
decisions. The same case summary is used as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Hypotheses
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) showed that when a lottery choice involves a
negative outcome (e.g., drawing a losing ticket), participants prefer the option with
fewer similar alternatives (e.g., 1/10 are losers preferred over 10/100 are losers). If the
risk of paresthesia occurring is viewed as similar to a negative lottery choice, then
patients would prefer to take the risk when fewer similar alternatives are available (e.g.,
1/370 as compared to 100/37,000). Thus, since mock jurors are supposed to decide

what the patient would have done had the risk of paresthesia been disclosed, they should
find in the plaintiff’s favor more often when psychological uncertainty is high rather than
low (because when psychological uncertainty is high a reasonable person would be more
likely to refuse treatment). Consequently, participants will be more biased against the
defendant, resulting in Hypothesis I:
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Hypothesis 3.1 Mock jurors wOl find the defendant liable more often, award more in
damages, assign the defendant more liability, and have more favorable
ratings o f the plaintiff (and less favorable ratings of the defendant) in
the high PU condition than in the low PU condition.
Based on previous research in which changing how the information is framed
reverses participants’ preferences (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992) Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 3.2 Framing and psychological uncertainty will interact such that
participants will be more favorable to the plaintiff in the negative frame
and more favorable to the defendant in the positive condition.
Method
Participants. Participants were 112 undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra
credit for their participation. Sixty-four percent were women and 83% were white. The
mean age was 19.17 years (SD = 2.29, Mdn = 19).
Materials & Design. Experiment 3 is a 2 (framing) x 2 (psychological
uncertainty) between subjects design. Framing is manipulated by indicating the number
of surgeries in which the injury does (negative) or does not (positive) occur. That is, the
physician states either that 1 in 370 surgeries result in paresthesia or 369 in 370 surgeries
do not result in paresthesia. Note that paresthesia is used as the injury to avoid any
ceiling effects as may be encountered by a more severe injury.
The two levels of psychological uncertainty (PU) are 1 in 370 (low), and 100 in
37,000 (high). These were chosen to represent the verbal equivalent of the word “rare”
as determined by Merz et al. (1991). The same case summary is used as in Experiments
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1 and 2, with the above changes to the probability of the risk occurring in the physician’s
explanation of the non-disclosure.
Procedure & Dependent Variables. The same procedure and dependent variables
are used as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
As in Experiments I and 2, the liability judgments were subjected to a logistic
regression (frame and psychological uncertainty entered as categorical predictor
variables), and the damage awards were collapsed across conditions in order to carry out
planned comparisons (due to the low number of liable verdicts: 38% across conditions1*)
concerning the hypotheses on the natural log of the damage awards (independent t-tests
for both factors). All other dependent variables were subjected to 2x2 between subjects
ANOVAs.
Hypothesis 3.1 states that mock jurors will find the defendant liable more often,
award more in damages, assign the defendant more liability, and have more favorable
ratings of the plaintiff in the high PU condition than in the low PU condition. An
independent samples t-test found that participants did indeed award more in damages
when psychological uncertainty was high (M = 11.85, SD = 2.15, n = 23) than when it
was low (M = 10.47, SD = 2.40, n = 16), t(37) = 1.87, £ < .05, t]2= 103.19 However,
contrary to expectations, psychological uncertainty did not have a significant effect on
“This is slightly higher than that found in Experiment 2 (28%) and the
paresthesia injury condition of Experiment 1 (33%).
I9Raw damage award values are: HighPU (M = $1.133.913: SD = $2.819.576:
Mdn = $100,000) and Low PU (M = $442,188; SD = $1,243,369; Mdn = $30,000).
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any o f the other variables (liability decisions: = . 18, £ = .74; defendant culpability:
F(l,103) = 0.77, £ = .38; overall rating of the plaintiff: F(l,108) = 1.99, £ = .16; plaintiff
informedness: F(I,106) = 0.004, £ = .95).
Hypothesis 3.2 states that framing and psychological uncertainty will interact. A
significant cross-over interaction was found for plaintiff informedness, F( 1,106) = 4.21, £
< .05, tj2 = .038 (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations). This interaction
indicates that when psychological uncertainty is low, participants rate the plaintiff as
significantly more informed in the negative frame than in the positive frame, t(52) = 1.63,
£ < .05. Conversely, when psychological uncertainty is high, participants rate the
plaintiff as more informed in the positive frame than in the negative frame, although this
difference does not reach significance, t(54) = 1.26, £=.11.
Table 4. Means (standard deviations) and sample size for plaintiff informedness.
Psychological Uncertainty
Low

High

Positive

4.67
(1.41)
n = 27

5.14
(1.24)
n = 28

Negative

5.22
(1.05)
n = 27

4.71
(1.30)
n = 28

Frame

”

“

This interaction was not significant for any of the other dependent variables
(liability decisions: = .36, £ = .66; damage awards: F(l,35) = 0.06, £ = .81;20 defendant

“ Since cell sizes ranged from 5-12, so any conclusions must be tempered.
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culpability: F(l,103) = 0.06, £ = .81; and overall rating of thejriaintiff: F(l,108) = 0.99,
£=.32).
Framing Effects A main effect of framing was found for the defendant

culpability ratings, F(l,103) = 3.84, £ < .05, q2= .036, such that the defendant was rated
as more culpable in the positive frame condition (M = 58.81, SD = 27.50, n = 57) than in
the negative frame condition (M = 49.30, SD = 22.68, n = 50). This main effect was not
significant for the liability decision (£ = .12, £ = .83), damage award (t(37) = .74, £ =
.23), overall rating of the plaintiff (F(l, 108) = .002, p = .97), or ratings of plaintiff
informedness: F(l, 106) = 0.07, £ = .79).
Components of Liability. The two questions concerning the conditions necessary
for finding the defendant liable were subjected to 2x2 between subjects ANOVAs.21 As
with the culpability ratings, there was a main effect of framing, F(l, 106) = 6.72, £ < .05,
q2= .060, for agreement with the statement that “A reasonable person would require to
be informed about the potential risk of paresthesia in order to make an informed decision
about whether or not to undergo the surgery.” Participants agreed with the statement
more when the risk information was framed negatively (M = 5.40, SD = 1.51), than
when framed positively (M = 4.58, SD = 1.75). Neither the main effect for
psychological uncertainty nor the interaction was significant for this question, F’s < 1,
£*s > .39.

21As in Experiments 1 and 2, the correlation between the two components was
low, r = .29, suggesting that participants were not treating the two questions as the
same, thereby allowing for each question to be analyzed separately.
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There were no significant main effects or interactions, P s < 1, j>’s > .38,
concerning agreement with the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of
paresthesia she would not have decided to undergo the surgery.” Thus, it appears that
message framing influenced ratings of what a person would want to know, but would not
have influenced the decision to undergo the surgery.
Supplementary Analyses. The same supplementary analyses as in Experiments 1

and 2 were conducted, replicating the results previously found. Participants voting liable
had a higher overall impression of the plaintiff, t(102) = 6.27, £ < 05 (liable: M = 4.41,
SD = 0.82; not liable: M = 3.22, SD = 1.01), while those who voted not liable had a
higher overall impression of the defendant, t(101) = 3.93, £ < .05 (not liable: M = 4.63,
SD = 0.98; liable: M = 3.79, SD = 1.13).
Discussion
Mixed support was found for the hypotheses of Experiment 3. As expected,
participants awarded more in damages when psychological uncertainty was high than
when it was low. However, psychological uncertainty did not significantly affect any of
the other dependent variables. One reason for not obtaining an effect for any of these
other variables may have to do with the task. Previous research on psychological
uncertainty has presented participants with two options of the same probability to choose
from. That is, participants typically see both levels of psychological uncertainty. In the
current study, participants were exposed to only one level of psychological uncertainty.
It could be that without having a second option to choose from, one does not focus on
the properties of the numbers making up the frequency resulting in the typical findings.
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Future studies on psychological uncertainty in a medical situation may want to present
the information in two ways, such as a second opinion from another physician, and then
have the patient decide which physician they would prefer to perform the procedure.
Partial support was also found for the expected interaction between framing and
psychological uncertainty. A significant cross-over interaction was found for ratings of
how informed the plaintiff was, but not for any other dependent variable.
Another main finding was that participants rated the defendant as being more
culpable when the risk information was framed as occurring, than when it was framed as
not occurring. However, participants also had higher ratings of agreement that a
reasonable person would want to be informed about the risk of paresthesia when the
information was framed as not occurring than when framed as occurring. This pattern
seems to contradict itself as one would expect that the defendant would be held more
responsible when participants were more likely to feel that the information should be
disclosed.
Finally, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the supplementary analyses were replicated,
again showing that participants voting liable had a higher overall impression of the
plaintiff, while those voting not liable had a higher overall impression of the defendant.
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Experiment 4: Treatment Choice
The three previous Experiments have addressed how jurors make decisions partly
based on whether or not the plaintiffwould have made the same choice had she been
provided the non-disclosed information. However, jurors in this task, already know of
the negative outcome (surgery resulted in an injury). Having this knowledge of the
negative outcome may cause jurors to assign too much weight to the information
concerning the non-disclosed risk. This is known as the hindsight bias, and has been
shown to influence many types of decisions (Casper & Benedict, 1993; ChristensenSzalanski & Willham, 1991; Fischhoff 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Thompson,
Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981; Zickafoose & Bomstein, 1999).
Because the effect size of the hindsight bias has been shown to be larger the less
familiar one is with the task, the trial situation may be especially susceptible to the
hindsight bias due to the difficulty and unfamiliarity of the tasks that jurors are expected
to perform (i.e., determining liability and awarding damages) (Christensen-Szalanski &
Willham, 1991; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). For example, Casper and Benedict (1993)
manipulated outcome information in a search and seizure trial. Participants were told
that, in the search, police either found or did not find heroin. Participants awarded more
in damages when no heroin was found as opposed to when heroin was found.
Furthermore, Zickafoose and Bomstein (1999) found that mock jurors, in a medical
malpractice case, are unable to ignore the amount of negligence contributed by the
plaintiff resulting in “double discounting” of the damage award. Thus, knowing the
outcomes can influence mock juror decisions.
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Since hindsight has been shown to influence mock juror decisions, it would be
important to know if participants in the previous three Experiments would make the
same decisions without knowledge of the negative outcome. Experiment 4 addresses
this problem, by replicating Experiment 3 using a slightly different task.
Instead of determining liability in a trial, participants in Experiment 4 are given a
summary containing the same information concerning the initial complaint and the
physician’s recommendation and discussion of the risks involved as used in the previous
Experiments. This summary though, stops at the point of the patient deciding whether
or not to undergo the surgery. At this point, the participant is informed of the potential
risk of paresthesia associated with the surgery (the patient is not told of this
information). The participant is then asked to indicate whether or not the patient should
undergo the surgery (using a 7-point scale anchored by definitely should undergo the
surgery, and definitely should not). No information concerning the outcome of the
surgery is provided in the summary.
Hypotheses
Participants are supposed to decide what the patient should do had the risk of
paresthesia been disclosed. This is similar to the agreement ratings of whether the
plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery had she been informed of the risk of
paresthesia in Experiments 1-3. Consequently, the same hypotheses from Experiment 3
are used for Experiment 4.
Hypothesis 4.1 Participants will indicate that the patient should still undergo the
surgery more when PU is low than when PU is high.
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Based on previous research in which changing how the information is framed
reverses participants’ preferences (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992) Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 4.2 Framing and psychological uncertainty will interact such that
participants will indicate that the patient should undergo the surgery in
the negative frame but should not undergo the surgery in the positive
frame.
Method
Participants. Participants were 74 undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes at a large southeastern university who received extra
credit for their participation.
Materials & Design. Experiment 4 is a 2 (framing) x 2 (psychological
uncertainty) between subjects design. The same basic facts used in the case summary in
Experiments 1-3 are used for Experiment 4. This includes, the initial complaint leading
to the patient going to her physician, the recommendation of the physician to see a
specialist, the specialist’s recommendation to undergo treatment, and the amount of time
spent by the physician going over the procedure. The scenario also states that the
patient is not informed of the risk of paresthesia. The main difference between the
previous studies and Experiment 4 is that instead of participants determining liability in a
malpractice lawsuit, participants were asked to indicate whether the patient should
undergo treatment had she been given the information about the risk of paresthesia.
Nowhere in the scenario is there an indication of the outcome of the surgery, thereby
reducing the impact of hindsight on the decision. However, hindsight may still play a
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role since participants are given information the patient is not (the probability of
paresthesia occurring).
Dependent Variable and Procedure. Participants read the one page scenario and
then answered the following question on a seven-point scale, anchored by “definitely
should” and “definitely should not”: “Given the risk of paresthesia, please indicate below
whether you believe that Mrs. Emerson should undergo the surgery to alleviate the
numbness in her arm that led her to see her doctor in the first place.“ The entire
procedure took approximately 5-10 minutes.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 4 was an attempt to see if decisions made without the negative
outcome information would be affected by psychological uncertainty and framing. To
test this, the agreement ratings were subjected to a 2(framing) x 2(psychological
uncertainty) between subjects ANOVA. It was found that participants felt that the
patient should still undergo the surgery significantly more when the risk information was
framed in terms of the injury not occurring (M = 5.57, SD = 1.19) than when framed as
the injury occurring (M = 4.78, SD = 1.65), F(l,70) = 5.50, p < .05. Neither the main
effect for psychological uncertainty nor the interaction was significant (F(l,70) = 1.39, p
= .24; F(l,70) = 0.22, p = .64 respectively).
The question asked in Experiment 4 is akin to that in Experiment 3 asking for
agreement to the statement “Had Mrs. Emerson known of the risk of paresthesia, she
would NOT HAVE decided to undergo the surgery.” While framing did not reach
significance on this question in Experiment 3, the trend was the same as found in
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Experiment 4. As in Experiment 3, psychological uncertainty did not significantly effect
the ratings of whether or not the patient should still undergo the surgery.
The fact that framing had an effect in Experiment 4, while not having an effect in
Experiment 3, lends credence to the theory that hindsight played a role in the lack of
results in Experiment 3. Typical findings of hindsight studies indicate that participants
are unable to ignore outcome information resulting in different decisions than when not
presented the outcome information (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Hindsight is a very
robust phenomenon (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) and has been found to occur both when
making judgments for yourself and when evaluating decisions of other people (Baron &
Hershey, 1988; Mitchell & Kalb, 1981). For example, Baron and Hershey (1988),
examining medical treatment decisions and monetary gambles, found that outcome
information influenced evaluations of the quality of the decision, the competence of the
decision maker, and the willingness of the subject to let the decision maker make
decisions for them. Mitchell and Kalb (1981) also showed that hindsight can be applied
to other peoples’ decisions by exploring how outcome information influenced supervisor
performance ratings. They found that the outcome of the decision was more important
in the supervisors’ ratings than the actual decision made. So, once again, knowing the
outcome of some series of events influences how people perceive those events.
In the current Experiments, when participants do not know of the negative
outcome resulting from the surgery (Exp. 4), they are more likely to believe that the
patient should undergo the surgery when it is framed in a manner that appears to limit
the possibility of that injury occurring. However, if the outcome information is known
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(Exp.3 ), then participants are no more likely to recommend undergoing the surgery
according to the framing of the risk. Thus, knowing the outcome information, resulted
in different recommendations. However, since Experiment 4 did not directly manipulate
hindsight, future studies that directly test this conclusion are necessary.
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General Discussion
The current experiments were designed with two main goals in mind. First, they
were designed to ascertain how the conveyance of risk information affects juror
decisions, thereby providing suggestions on how to present arguments concerning
probabilities in the most effective manner The second goal was to replicate and extend
the literature on how people understand and utilize probabilistic information. A medical
malpractice case involving a claim of a lack of informed consent was chosen for this
purpose because it addresses both goals. It involves a legal claim which health care
providers face, some say at a growing pace (Annas, 1976; Curran, 1970; Hirsh &
Wilcox, 1992; Slovenko, 1997), and it makes the probability of a non-disclosed risk
occurring very salient. That is, the point of contention is why the patient was not
informed of the possibility of the complication occurring. Thus, how the probability of
that risk occurring is presented would conceivably play a large role.
In regard to the first goal, Experiments 1 and 2 found that mock jurors’ liability,
culpability, and damage award decisions were all not significantly affected by the format
of the probability expression. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that whether the
probability of the complication occurring was described with a verbal estimate,
quantitative estimate, or a combination of both did not matter. Experiment 2 extended
this by finding no differences between probabilities expressed as percentages or
frequencies. The results of the first two Experiments also indicate that the base rate of
the complication arising does not play a role in mock juror liability and damage award
decisions. However, it could be that the base rate manipulation was not sufficiently
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salient and was thus ignored by the participants, while they focused on other aspects of
the summary. Even if the manipulation was salient enough, it could be that the base
rates used were all sufficiently low that they fell below some threshold for action
(Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989). If that is the case, then participants could have been
aware of the base rate, but treated all of the conditions as essentially the same. This
possibility is bolstered by the finding of a three-way interaction for culpability in
Experiment 1. It examining this interaction, it was found that the severity of the injury
only had an effect (i.e., more severe injury resulting in higher culpability ratings) in the
high base rate condition when a quantitative expression of probability was used (either
alone or in conjunction with a verbal expression). This would suggest that the high base
rate condition may have been above the threshold, while the other two conditions were
not. However, since a manipulation check for comprehension of the base rate
manipulation was not included, strong conclusions about the (non)effects of base rate on
mock juror decisions are not warranted.
The results of Experiment 3 indicated that how frequency information is framed
affected culpability ratings. Mock jurors rated the defendant as being more culpable
(responsible) when the risks were framed as “The injury occurs in 1 out of 370
procedures” than when framed as “The injury does not occur in 369 out of 370
procedures.” Thus, it would appear that if physicians are confronted with a lack of
informed consent case, their safest strategy for being judged least responsible would be
to focus the description on how often the injury does not occur. However, this was only
examined with frequency information. Further research needs to be conducted to
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determine if this relationship holds for information presented as probabilities and
percentages as well.
Experiment 3 also found that mock jurors awarded more in damages when the
psychological uncertainty was high as compared to when it was low. This would suggest
that when using frequency information, the interests of the defendant are best served by
reducing the ratio of the frequency so that the numerator reflects smaller absolute
numbers. Conversely, plaintiffs would be best served to adjust the ratio so that the
numerator contains larger absolute numbers. However, since this is the first experiment
to examine how psychological uncertainty affects damage awards, much more research is
needed to explore the boundaries of this phenomenon before any strong
recommendations can be made.
Taken as a whole, the results of Experiments 1-3 indicate that the probability
expression used to describe the likelihood of a complication occurring during a medical
procedure has little impact on the mock jurors’ liability ratings and damage awards.
Given the null results within each experiment, and the fact that there was little variation
across all three experiments in either culpability ratings (values ranged from 47%-58%)
or liability decisions (26%-42%), there is little basis for recommending the use of any
one type of probability expression over another. As such, it would be beneficial to
compare the current results to those of previous researchers, in order to provide
recommendations.
Siegrist (1997) suggests using frequency information when one wants to
emphasize the threat of a risk and to use probabilistic expressions to downplay
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differences between risk levels. Accordingly, in a trial situation where the defendant is
trying to downplay the likelihood of a risk occurring, he/she would be better off by not
using frequency information. On the other hand, if a health care provider wants a patient
to understand a risk, or some other type of probabilistic information, then, according to
Siegrist, presenting that information as a frequency may be more effective. Experiment
4, which examined how participants believed a patient would act based on some
probabilistic information, found that how the information was framed influenced whether
or not participants would recommend undergoing treatment. However, Experiment 4
did not directly compare frequency and percentage expressions, and thus did not provide
a meaningful evaluation of Siegrist’s claims.
Experiments 1-3, however, did directly address the claims by Siegrist (1997).
Not only did Experiments 1-3 fail to find evidence supporting Siegrist’s suggestion, but
an examination of the damage awards provides evidence against it. While null results
were the typical finding concerning mean damage awards (with the exception of a main
effect due to psychological uncertainty in Experiment 3), the small sample size and large
negative skew of the data suggest that the median amounts may be more informative
than the mean awards. In examining the median awards across all three experiments, a
pattern emerges (see Table 5 for the median damage award for each expression of
probability across Experiments 1-3).
Beginning with Experiment 1, it can be seen that higher median damages were

awarded when a verbal expression of probability was used (either alone or in conjunction
with a quantitative value) than when a quantitative expression was used. Experiment 2
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then explored two different types of quantitative expression and found that frequency
expressions resulted in lower median awards than percentage expressions. Finally,
Experiment 3 examined two different types of frequency expressions and found that
having low psychological uncertainty resulted in lower median awards than high
psychological uncertainty. Thus, the lowest median award was for a frequency
expression, while the highest median award was for a verbal expression. This pattern,
coupled with the null results in liability and culpability ratings, suggests that physiciandefendants who wish to maximize their defense (i.e., decrease the likelihood of being
found liable, but if they are, then decrease the damage award) should express probability
information in terms of frequencies with low psychological uncertainty. This contradicts
the suggestion by Siegrist (1997).
Table 5. Median damage award amounts for probability expressions across experiments.
Median Damage
Award in Dollars

Probability Expression
Experiment 1
Verbal
Quantitative
Verbal & Quantitative

250,000
100,000
250,000

Experiment 2
Percent
Frequency

100,000
50,000

Experiment 3
High Psychological Uncertainty
Low Psychological Uncertainty

100,000
30,000

The second goal of the current experiments was to replicate and extend the
previous research concerning the interpretation and use of probabilistic information and
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juror decision making On this account, there was limited success. Experiment 1 was
able to replicate previous research indicating that the severity of the injury influences
both liability decisions (Bomstein, 1998; Feigenson et al., 1997) and damage awards
(Bovbjerget al., 1991; Feigenson et al., 1997; Rodgers, 1991; Vidmar, 1995).
However, the current experiments failed to replicate previous research showing that the
type of probability expression used influences participants’ decisions (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hof&age, 1995; Siegrist, 1997; Slovic et al., 2000; Tversky
& Koehler, 1994; Teigen & Bran, 1999; Windschitl & Wells, 1995). While this was the
first attempt to extend these findings to a civil trial, the similarities between the task used
here and in previous research (e.g., the criminal trial used by Thompson & Schumann,
1987, and Siegrist’s (1997) examination o f decisions based on the probability o f a
complication arising from a medical treatment) is enough to suggest that similar findings
should result. However, it might not be just a civil trial, but the fact that it was a medical
malpractice trial. As mentioned earlier, malpractice trials tend to be treated differently
from other types of trials. Nearly all malpractice claims (93%) are settled out of court
(or discontinued or dismissed) before trial. Of the 7% making it to trial, 50% of those
are settled during trial. Of the 3% that make it to a verdict, 80% result in verdicts in
favor of the defendant (Mackauf 1999; Taragin et al., 1992).
Another difference between the medical malpractice case used here and
Thompson and Schumann’s (1987) criminal trial revolves around the fact at issue. In
Thompson and Schumann’s study, the fact in dispute (as in most criminal trials) was “did
the defendant do it.” Thus, the probability evidence was presented to answer the
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question, “Did the hair sample match the defendant?” In the current studies, whether or
not the defendant “did it” is not in dispute —the risk information admittedly was not
disclosed. As such, the question being addressed by the evidence is “should it have been
disclosed.” Since the jury is being asked to answer different questions in the two types
of trials, it might be that probabilistic information may be treated differently. For
example, when supplied to answer the “did he do if’ question, it may be viewed as the
most relevant information. However, if the probability evidence is being introduced to
answer the “should it have been disclosed” question, it may be only one o f many
considerations. However, it is not clear what those other considerations may be.
A second finding in conjunction with the second goal was that across all of the
experiments in which participants rendered a liability decision, those who determined the
defendant was liable had a better overall impression of the plaintiff, while those who
determined the defendant was not liable had a better overall impression o f the defendant.
This is consistent with the idea that jurors base their liability decisions, at least in part, on
how much they like the defendant (Mackauf, 1999). Mackauf (1999) claimed that jurors
are willing to forgive almost any malpractice if they like the health care provider (i.e.,
find him/her to be caring, competent, and compassionate) but will find against the health
care provider if they dislike him/her (i.e., find him/her arrogant, lazy, or incompetent),
even if no malpractice has occurred. While the current findings are not a direct test of
these claims, they are at least consistent with the idea that personal feelings toward the
health care provider are related to liability decisions.
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Limitations and Future Directions
The current studies were the first attempt to extend how people comprehend and
use probabilistic information to a civil lawsuit concerning medical malpractice. In doing
so, a number o f characteristics of a real trial were altered to give the best chance of
replicating previous findings. For instance, while the malpractice case used was based on
an actual case in which the plaintiffwon, the current studies used a two-page summary
of the trial. Although the summary included the facts surrounding the case, it may not
have had the same effect on jurors as an actual trial.
Two different studies have found that the mode of presentation affects
dichotomous guilt verdicts in criminal trials (Bermant, McGuire, McKinley, & Salo,
1974; Juhnke et al., 1979). The conclusion from these studies is that researchers should
design their studies more closely to what actually happens in the courtroom. An
interesting finding in the Bermant et al. (1974) study is that as the mode of presentation
became more realistic, more participants voted not guilty. However, the actual case on
which they based the study resulted in a verdict of manslaughter. As such, maybe their
call for greater verisimilitude in research is not necessary. In addition, Juhnke et al.
(1979) found the opposite result.
Wissler et al. (1997) suggest that short summaries may be more appropriate
when studying damage awards, since the majority of the trial concerns the issue of
liability. Furthermore, Wissler et al. (1997) report two unpublished studies (Hart,
Wissler, & Saks, 1994; Diamond, Dimetropoulos, Landsman, & Saks, 199S) that
compared non-economic damage awards for 6-sentence scenarios, 14-sentence
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scenarios, and a three-hour videotaped mock trial. These studies showed that the length
of the written case scenarios had no effect on the pain and suffering awards and that the
mean awards for the written scenarios were within a quarter of a standard deviation of
the awards from the videotaped trial. Kramer and Kerr (1989), in examining the biasing
effect of pretrial publicity, also M ed to find an effect due to trial length. Bornstein
(1999), in a review of the jury simulation literature, found eleven studies that directly
compared the trial medium. Of those eleven studies, only three found the presentation
medium to have a main effect on mock jurors’ verdicts. Furthermore, the results of
those three studies were conflicting (i.e., the Bermant et al., 1974 and Juhnke et al., 1979
studies described above). Thus, it appears that using a trial summary would not
necessarily invalidate the current findings. However, Diamond (1997) has argued that
because some differences have been found due to how realistic a trial is, in the interest of
ecological validity, future studies should involve a full trial (videotaped if possible).
A second limitation is that participants did not deliberate. However, studying
individual decisions allows for examination of the underlying processes that serve as the
basis for the group's decision (Wissler et al., 1997), or, stated another way, the focus
was on individual judgment processes. Even so, it has been shown that during
deliberations damage awards may become a bartering tool that allows a compromise
between the majority view and the minority view (Guinther, 1988). Thus, future studies
should also include deliberations.
A final limitation is that a specific type of case (medical malpractice) involving a
specific type of claim (lack of informed consent) was used for the current experiments.
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It has already been mentioned that malpractice cases are treated differently from other
types of civil suits (Moller, 1996; Taragin et al., 1992). Vidmar et al. (1994) suggested
some reasons for the differences between medical malpractice lawsuits and auto
accidents: (1) Malpractice cases usually involve more than one defendant (auto accident
cases usually just have one); (2) multiple theories of liability are more common in
malpractice cases; (3) the primary dispute in malpractice cases is liability, while the
primary dispute in auto accident cases typically hinges on damages; (4) the fact patterns
leading to the injury are different; (5) in malpractice cases the injured plaintiff is usually a
passive participant in the events, while in auto accident cases, it may be possible to
assign some of the responsibility to the plaintiff; and finally (6) there is a professional and
fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the physician. This last suggestion may
explain why no differences were found between types of probability expressions. It
could be that mock jurors take into account this professional and fiduciary relationship
when making their decisions. That is, they start with the assumption that health care
providers are motivated by helping people, and as such, are loath to find against a health
care provider absent obvious direct evidence to the contrary. If this is the case, then
extending the current studies to other types of civil suits could provide a better
opportunity for replicating previous research showing that people respond differently to
various probability expressions.
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Appendix A
Mapping of Verbal Expressions of Probability
Quantitative Equivalent

Verbal Expression

.6310
.2818
.1585
.0100
.1585
.1000
.0316
.0631
.0050
.00001
.0016
.0631
.0025
.0100
.0010
.0063
.0027
.0027
.0027
.0003
.0158
.0010
.0158
.0027
.0027
.00001
.0040
.0316
.0040
.0006
.0001
.0040

Very High
Great Likelihood
Rather High
Quite Common
Frequent
Common
Possible
Uncommon
Unusual
Infrequent
Occasional
Low
Negligible
Not High
Small
Minimal
Quite Unusual
Quite Small
Rare
Remote
Very Slight
Very Low
Very Unlikely
Very Small
Very Rare
Very Remote
Extremely Low
Extremely Unlikely
Extremely Small
Extremely Rare
Extremely Remote
Very Very Minimal

Note. Because the quantitative equivalents were based on anywhere from 1-10
observations, the verbal expressions are ordered in terms of what the rankings of typical
mapping studies find. Bolded values are those used for Experiment 1.
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Appendix B
Case Summary
Plaintiff-

Jessie M. Emerson

Defendant:

Dr. Gerald Bell and Valley Forge General Hospital

Case Description: Medical Malpractice due to Lack of Informed Consent.
Facts:
Mrs. Emerson, age 50, went to her family physician (Dr. Brian Emler) on January
24,1992, after complaining of numbness and tingling in the left arm. Dr. Emler
recommended that she see a specialist, Dr. Gerald Bell. On February 5, 1992, she went
to see Dr. Bell, a neurosurgeon, who conducted a number of tests. One o f the tests, an
MRI, discovered a tumor in the spinal column. Acting on the recommendation of Dr.
Bell, Mrs. Emerson underwent surgery on February 19,1992 to remove the tumor.
During the removal of the small tumor, the spinal cord was injured resulting in the entire
left side of Mrs. Emerson’s body becoming permanently numb and tingling, a condition
known as paresthesia. At issue is whether Dr. Bell provided enough information to Mrs.
Emerson to make her aware that the surgery could result in this condition. The actual
consent form is included as Exhibit A.
Plaintiffs Case:
Mrs. Emerson claims that the surgery took place without the legally mandated
informed consent because it was never fully explained to her that the entire left side of
her body could become permanently numb and tingling as a result from the surgery. She
states that Dr. Bell spoke to her extensively about how the surgery would be performed,
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but did not discuss the risk o f paresthesia. To support her claim Mrs. Emerson’s attorney
produced the consent form (Exhibit A) that Mrs. Emerson signed in which neither
paresthesia nor numbness is listed as a risk factor. Mrs. Emerson claimed that had she
known of the possibility of the entire left side of her body becoming numb she would
have not undergone the surgery.
Defendant’s Case:
Dr. Bell claims to have spent about 15-20 minutes with Mrs. Emerson going over
the standard informed consent used by the hospital. During this time he covered what
the procedure would involve (what and how it would be done) and addressed her
concerns about the procedure. He states that he explained in plain English what each of
the risks listed on the second page of the consent form meant and provided an estimate
of the likelihood of these risks occurring. Dr. Bell admits that paresthesia is not listed as
a potential risk, but claims that since research shows this injury occurs in only 3 out of
10,000 cases it does not warrant disclosure. Furthermore, Dr. Bell claims there has to be
a cut-off in which a risk need not be explained due to the low likelihood of its
occurrence, otherwise the potential risks for any procedure could reach into the
hundreds, and it would take too long and confuse the patient to cover them all. Dr. Bell
also claims that Mrs. Emerson was provided with an opportunity to ask any questions
concerning the procedure and that she signed the form stating that all of her questions
had been answered to her satisfaction.
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Informed Consent Law:
The case you just read is only concerned with whether or not an informed
consent was achieved. It does NOT involve whether Dr. Bell was negligent in the
performance of the surgery. That matter has already been resolved. You are only to
consider the issue of informed consent.
The doctrine of informed consent requires that a patient be provided with any
and all information that a reasonable person would require, in a manner that he/she can
understand, in order to make an informed decision as whether to undergo a specific
treatment. This includes a description of the procedure, the potential benefits, the
potential risks, and the availability of alternative procedures. Informed consent is not
merely the signing of a form giving permission to proceed, but it is a process in which
both the patient and the health care provider exchange information allowing the patient
to reach an informed decision concerning his/her treatment. Indeed, signed forms are not
legally necessary.
In order to find the defendant liable for malpractice for a lack of informed
consent, you must determine that Dr. Bell did not disclose the risk of paresthesia to Mrs.
Emerson and that if he had, that Mrs. Emerson would not have undergone the surgery.
The legal standard for coming to this conclusion is by a preponderance of the evidence.
This means that the evidence shows that the defendant is more likely than not to have
committed malpractice.
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Request for Compensation:
If you determine that Dr. Bell was negligent by not disclosing the risk of
paresthesia, Mrs. Emerson is allowed compensation for her injuries: numbness and
tingling of the entire left side of her body. As a result of the injuries suffered by Mrs.
Emerson, she is also no longer is able to knit and finds it extremely difficult to cook for
herself both activities she enjoyed prior to the surgery. Also, physically active prior to
her injuries, Mrs. Emerson is no longer able to go swimming, or do water aerobics, and
the numbness has made walking difficult for her.
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